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Abstract 
 
 Liberia has become the quintessential example of an African failed 
state.  Though Liberia’s civil war is officially over, war criminals are free and 
some are even helping run the transitional government under the authority of 
Liberia’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).  This peace agreement 
calls for the consideration of a general amnesty for those involved in the 
Liberian civil war alongside the parceling of governmental functions among 
members of various rebel groups.  The drafters of the agreement claim that 
this was the only viable solution for sustainable peace in Liberia.  Meanwhile, 
Charles Taylor relaxes in Nigeria’s resort city of Calabar.   
 To contrast Liberia, Sierra Leone took the brave step of implementing 
the SCSL when it realized that its peace agreement – which had similar goals 
and structure to Liberia’s – was a failure.  Sierra Leone’s decision signals a 
desire to begin the transition to rule of law and the end of rule by impunity.  
Sierra Leone can be a model for Liberia.  This Comment revisits the colonial 
period in Liberia to track the growth of a culture of impunity.  This rule by 
Liberian elites, without answering to their own people, has directly caused a 
failure of the Liberian state.  I suggest that a Special Court for Liberia, instead 
of less punitive transitional mechanisms, would create a hands-on approach to 
                                                 
 ∗ Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California Berkeley, J.D. 2005.  The 
thought to write on transitional justice in Liberia came to me while I was an extern in 
the chambers of Judge Terry Hatter Jr., US District Judge, Central District of 
California.  This was the summer that Charles Taylor departed Liberia for exile in 
Nigeria.  My thoughts on all of the issues that arose after that summer of 2003 are in 
this paper.  I would like to thank the following people for inspiration, guidance, and 
hard work in getting this piece together:  David K. Leonard, Dean of Inter Area 
Studies U.C. Berkeley, Angela Harris, Professor of Law Boalt Hall School of Law, 
and Kathleen Savage.    
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building the respect for a tradition of rule of law and justice in a country that 
lacks such a tradition.  If the intervention of the transitional government of 
Liberia and the international community is at the level of the exercise of elite 
power instead of at the level of reconciliation among the masses (which is 
where the TRC focuses its energies)-through the use of punitive mechanisms 
such as prosecution in a hybrid court of law, Liberia can begin to end the 
culture of impunity and ring in a sustainable peace.  In pursuing this goal of 
the implementation of the Special Court for Liberia, the CPA would need to 
be revised to reflect the concerns expressed in this Comment.  Primarily, a 
revised CPA must reject amnesty for war crimes and crimes against humanity 
as was done in Sierra Leone. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 Liberia is the classic portrait of a failed state.1  Today, Liberia is one 
of the world’s poorest countries.  According to World Bank indicators, 46% 
of its population is below the poverty line compared to 37% for the rest of 
Sub-Saharan Africa; the population of Liberia is generally undereducated, 
with a literacy rate of 44.1%; and Liberia faces a debt that cannot be 
realistically repaid.2  Two civil wars have left an estimated 200,000 people 
dead, created at least 250,000 new refugees, and displaced approximately 
350,000.3  This state of affairs did not arise overnight, and contrary to popular 
opinion, Liberia’s situation is not a result of deep rooted ethnic hatred or 
poverty.  These are only some of the symptoms of a bigger disease: the deadly 
                                                 
 1 JOHN-PETER PHAM, LIBERIA: PORTRAIT OF A FAILED STATE 224 (2004). 
 2 World Bank, Liberia at a Glance (2004) at 
http://worldbank.org/data/countrydata/aag/lbr_aag.pdf. (last visited March 7, 2005). 
 3 STEPHEN ELLIS, THE MASK OF ANARCHY: THE DESTRUCTION OF LIBERIA AND 
THE RELIGIOUS DIMENSION OF AN AFRICAN CIVIL WAR 315 (1999); Human Rights 
Watch, World Report 2003:  Liberia (2003) 48 at 
http://www.hrw.org/wr2k3/africa7.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2005) [hereinafter 
Human Rights Watch, World Report 2003:  Liberia (2003)]; CLIFF BERNATH & 
SARAH MARTIN, PEACEKEEPING IN WEST AFRICA:  A WORLD REPORT 3 (Refugees 
International 2004), available at 
http://www.refintl.org/files/2992_file_PK_WestAfrica_Jun04_v2.pdf (last visited 
Apr. 12, 2005).  
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effects of African governance in general and the Liberian culture of impunity 
in particular.   
 The development community seems to have missed the historical 
lesson of the impact of colonialism on the post-colonial state by pretending 
that measures such as “democracy”, development, and human rights 
promotion alone will cure all of the problems that plague failed and weak 
states in Africa.4  Yet, the reality is that states in Africa will not function 
properly until elites are held accountable, that is, when they are encouraged to 
rule over citizens rather than subjects.  Therefore, the project of democracy 
has to take a critical look at the culture of impunity that has become 
characteristic of African governance since decolonization.   
 Instead, the dominant theme of late for addressing post-conflict 
rebuilding in African states has been one of protracted diplomacy.5  Leonard 
Robinson, President of the Africa Society, recently suggested that ending 
conflict requires “patience, fortitude, understanding, the difficult skill of 
neutrality, and critically important, it requires that all parties negotiate in good 
faith.”6  In this same diplomatic spirit, commentators on Liberia’s most recent 
Accra Peace Agreement, the CPA, which formally ended the Liberian civil 
war and introduced the National Transition Government of Liberia, claim that 
this document has been a diplomatic effort to end Liberia’s fourteen-year civil 
war.7  The same policy makers claim that the departure of Charles Taylor 
from Liberia signals the beginning of peace in Liberia.8   
                                                 
 4 The development community continues to insist on the promotion of the rule of 
law, democracy, and human rights promotion in exchange for aid.  But, African 
leaders do not necessarily follow through on their declarations to work towards these 
goals.  As an alternative, David Leonard argues that Africa is in need of “effective 
development management” instead of more aid.  DAVID K. LEONARD & SCOTT 
STRAUS, AFRICA’S STALLED DEVELOPMENT:  INTERNATIONAL CAUSES & CURES 37-
38 (2003).  Achieving this effective development management involves four different 
types of management behavior—public policymaking, organizational leadership, 
internal administration, and bureaucratic hygiene.  Id.  
 5 See, e.g., Symposium, State Reconstruction After Civil Conflict, 95 AM J. INT’L 
L. 1 (2001) (noting that after the Second World War, internal conflicts usually end by 
negotiation and concession, not by conquest or unconditional surrender); Interview by 
Robert Siegel & Michele Norris (National Public Radio) with Jacques Paul Klein, UN 
Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Liberia, Washington, D.C. (Sept. 18, 
2003) (describing the efforts of the Nigerian government to force Charles Taylor to 
obey the conditions of his exile in Calabar). 
 6 Leonard H. Robinson, Jr., The Role of Diplomacy in African Conflict 
Resolution: The Case of Liberia in Context, 19 MILLER CENTER REPORT 28, 28-32, 
(2003).  
 7 See, e.g., National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, War Is Behind 
Us Now:  A Report On Focus Group Research in Liberia 6, 9 (2004) at  
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 Yet, curiously, the TRC has not dedicated itself to addressing issues 
of elite-sponsored violence in Liberia.  In fact, the Liberian peace agreement 
recommends the consideration of a general amnesty for all those involved in 
Liberia’s civil wars, which raises important issues about Liberia’s choice to 
privilege diplomacy over legal sanction of state-sponsored violence.9  The 
necessity of a quick peace at the expense of a sustained movement towards a 
culture free from the incessant cruelty of elite politics ensures that Liberia will 
not be an emblem of stability for West Africa in the foreseeable future.  Given 
Liberia’s past potential for this status, this state of affairs is regrettable.   
 Liberia’s choice, however, was not made in a political vacuum.  The 
international community and its persistent emphasis on light-handed and 
diplomatic peace measures has a great impact on Liberia’s peace process.10  In 
this vein, I argue that the international community’s emphasis on transitional 
mechanisms that focus on diplomatic measures and measures concentrating 
on the general populations of conflict states, rather than mechanisms that 
focus on swift justice through the use of criminal tribunals, places too much 
responsibility on Liberians in general and not enough blame on the elite 
power structure in Liberia in particular.  Focusing on these non-punitive 
transitional mechanisms that grant blanket amnesties to dangerous characters 
either denies or ignores the historical, political, and economic events that led 
to Liberia’s status as a failed state.  The international community and the 
transitional leaders in Liberia have allowed for a post-conflict situation where 
the route to peace is completely divorced from history.  A discussion of the 
rebuilding of a failed state like Liberia can only take place when leaders are 
candid about the nature of colonial rule, the type of rule resulting from 
colonial domination, and the complete failure of many other African leaders 
to be accountable for their behavior.  During post-conflict rebuilding, the 
injustice that results is that violence will ultimately begin anew.   
                                                                                                                    
http://www.accessdemocracy.org/library/1769_lr_war_100104.pdf; U.S. Policy 
Toward Liberia: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on 
International Relations House of Representatives, 108th Cong. 40 (2003) (statement 
of Nohn Kidau, President, Movement for Democratic Change in Liberia) [hereinafter 
U.S. Policy Toward Liberia (statement)].  
 8 Id.  
 9 Comprehensive Peace Agreement Between the Government of Liberia and the 
LURD and the MODEL and Political Parties, August 18, 2003, art. XXXIV, at  
http://www.usip.org/library/pa/liberia/liberia_08182003_toc.html [hereinafter CPA 
and Accra Peace to refer to this document] 
 10 See generally, Survivor’s Rights International, SRI Country Briefing:  Liberia 
22 (2003) (supporting the CPA’s proposed creation of a TRCand National 
Commission on Human Rights) at 
http://www.survivorsrightsinternational.org/pdfs/Liberia_report.pdf [hereinafter SRI 
Country Briefing:  Liberia]. 
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 In contrast to Liberia, Sierra Leone, Liberia’s neighbor, once had a 
similar agreement but quickly realized the grave problems that come with 
granting a blanket amnesty to high-level criminals.  Instead of granting a 
blanket amnesty to war criminals, the Sierra Leonean government created the 
SCSL to try those individuals most responsible for war crimes and for the 
looting of the Sierra Leonean state.11  Sierra Leone’s choice to privilege 
justice over diplomacy is a clear sign of that country’s realization of the need 
to end the culture of impunity in Sierra Leone.  Liberia, however, has decided 
to continue the status quo of impunity while paying lip service to democratic 
goals.12  This will only contribute to the culture of impunity that has existed in 
Liberia for years; Liberia is a failed state precisely because elite-sponsored 
violence continues to cause perpetual insecurity in Liberia. 
 Sierra Leone’s approach to justice, through its creation of a SCSL 
(SCSL) seems an apt model for Liberia given the similarities between the two 
countries.13  Liberia and the international community must realize two things 
on the road to Liberia’s reconstruction.  First, pursuing a justice that addresses 
the causes of the weak state phenomena in Liberia is a crucial step on the way 
to peace.  This type of justice must deal specifically with crimes committed 
by Liberian elites and other higher officials instead of focusing exclusively on 
those who actually carried out the atrocities.  Second, peace (and when I use 
this term I mean simply the existence of a secure society evidenced by a long-
term cessation of state sponsored violence and the delivery of political goods 
to the people within its borders), can be an achievable goal through the use of 
legal mechanisms that promote accountability.   
 Recognizing that emphasis on justice without equal commitments of 
military, political, and economic resources undermines goals of democracy, I 
consider the particular contribution of justice to post-conflict peace building 
in Liberia.  Part I provides a background for the Liberian crisis and puts 
Liberia’s history and the two most recent civil wars in context.  It also shows 
the similarities between Liberia’s and Sierra Leone’s conflicts.   
                                                 
 11 See generally, website for the SCSL  at http://www.sc-sl.org/frontpage.html 
(last visited Mar. 19, 2004); Compare Report of the Secretary-General on the 
Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, U.N. Doc. S/2000/915 (2000) 
(insisting that the amnesty provision in the Lome Peace Agreement cannot be granted 
in respect of international crimes), available at 
http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/2000/sgrep00.htm. [hereinafter Secretary General 
Report S/2000/915]  with  Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone 
and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, art. IX, July 7, 1999, available 
at http://www.usip.org/library/pa/sl/sierra_leone_07071999_toc.html (calling for a 
general amnesty) [hereinafter Lome Accord].  
 12 See generally, CPA, supra note 9.  
 13 Secretary-General Report S/2000/915, supra note 11.  
2005] RENA L. SCOTT  351 
 
 By providing a brief history of Liberia and its civil wars, Part II 
explains the emergence of the culture of impunity which has brought about 
the failure of Liberia as a modern state.  In particular, I suggest that Liberia 
has failed at protecting its people from insecurity precisely because these 
same elites benefit from a continuous insecurity and instability; for it is 
through the promotion of civil war that elites can enjoy the fruits of civil war.  
After describing the two peace agreements that ended the wars of Sierra 
Leone and Liberia respectively, highlighting the positive aspects and flaws of 
these peace agreements, I argue that the peace agreement approach to ending 
civil wars and transitioning to functioning states is inappropriate for countries 
like Liberia.  The major flaw in Liberia’s peace agreement is its failure to 
address elite-sponsored violence and its granting of a general amnesty to all 
the perpetrators of violence.  In fact, the peace agreement will not only be a 
historical failure but a sure recipe for renewed hostility and the perpetuation 
of the culture of impunity.   
 In Part III, I argue that an approach based on principles of justice, like 
the approach pursued in Sierra Leone, would be more appropriate.  I explain 
the framework of the SCSL14 and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(TRC) that have been set up in Sierra Leone.15  In Liberia, no court has been 
alluded to and the transitional government of Liberia missed the opportunity 
to learn from the Sierra Leone negotiation process.  Still, it may not be too 
late to hold some important figures accountable.  The current transitional 
government might call for this approach or the incoming administration in 
2005.  In discussing the urgent necessity of a Special Court, I address a likely 
critique: legal mechanisms such as trials do not consider the delicate political 
situation of transitional societies or other possible routes to peace and 
reconciliation.  As a preliminary response, I suggest that the failure of this 
critique is that it completely ignores the impact of colonialism on African 
governance and that the point of intervention of non-legal mechanisms – the 
masses or the victims of civil wars – allows elites to escape unscathed.  I 
argue instead that the new government for Liberia should establish a legal 
forum to address civil war violations.  This forum would only try those 
figures most responsible for fomenting war and looting the Liberian state.  
This article does not, however, address the type of remedy that the forum 
should impose.   
 A Special Court for Liberia could serve a threefold purpose.  First, 
this mechanism could further promote the campaign to end the culture of 
impunity in Liberia and in Africa as a whole.  Second, international 
commitment to Liberia would show a definite commitment to address 
violence in Africa in an even-handed manner.  Finally, a trial of this sort 
                                                 
 14 Id. at 21.  
 15 Lome Accord, art. VI, supra note 11. 
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could serve to prevent future state sponsored violence by promoting law 
reform in Liberia.  I recognize that the United States should and probably will 
play an important role in Liberia’s future.  The United States owes both 
historical and political duties to Liberia to serve as a guarantor of peace in 
Liberia just as France and Britain have done in conflicts in Cote d’Ivoire and 
Sierra Leone respectively.16   
I. 
LIBERIA AND IT’S NEIGHBOR’S HISTORY OF EXCLUSIONS, GRIEVANCES, 
AND GREED 
 Before delving into the most recent Liberian peace agreement, it is 
crucial to understand the economic, social, and political history that has 
brought Liberia to where it is today.  One of the central arguments throughout 
this article is that in negotiating peace agreements, the development 
community and policy makers should not forget to examine what has 
happened in the past and try to avoid the same errors.  The policy makers who 
have drafted the current peace agreement in Liberia seem to have forgotten 
Liberia’s colonial history, Liberia’s history under Liberian leadership, and the 
many serious abuses committed throughout Liberia’s civil wars.   
A. Early Political, Social, and Economic History of Africa’s First Republic 
under Black Leadership 
 Liberia was never officially colonized like other African states during 
the European “scramble for Africa.”17 But, the ideology upon which Liberia 
was founded was informed by the same foundational ideologies justifying 
colonization in other African countries.18  Liberia’s origins date back to 1822, 
when the settlement of Monrovia, named for U.S. President James Monroe,19 
                                                 
 16 See, e.g., ADEKEYE ADEBAJO, BUILDING PEACE IN WEST AFRICA:  LIBERIA, 
SIERRA LEONE, AND GUINEA-BISSAU 93-95 (1989) (discussing the British in Sierra 
Leone); Chris Mullin, Speech at the UK Mission to the UN (Feb. 6, 2004) 
(welcoming the willingness of the United States to take the lead in Liberia as the 
French are doing in Cote d’Ivoire), at 
http://www.ukun.org/articles_show.asp?SarticleType=17&Article_ID=731.  
 17 See generally, ROLAND OLIVER & ANTHONY ATMORE, AFRICA SINCE 1800, 65 
(4th ed. 1994).  The “scramble for Africa” describes the manner in which European 
powers pushed for the partition of Africa during the third quarter of the nineteenth 
century, WALTER RODNEY, HOW EUROPE UNDERDEVELOPED AFRICA, 137 (1982) 
(describing period where Europeans made a grab for whatever they thought spelled 
profits in Africa). 
 18 PHAM, supra note 1, at 20.   
 19 EGHOSA E. OSAGHAE, ETHNICTY, CLASS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR STATE 
POWER IN LIBERIA 25 (1996). 
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was established.20  Aided by the American Colonization Society and many 
other principally African-American groups, freed slaves who had long 
harbored hopes of returning to Africa began coming to Liberia as early as 
1820, when the first group of about eighty sailed on the Elizabeth.21  While 
maintaining strong ties to the United States, Liberia became an independent 
nation in 1847.22 
 Little is known of the history of present day Liberia before its modern 
establishment, but its ethnic situation is complex.  Of the sixteen indigenous 
ethnic groups, no one group in particular has ever represented a majority of 
the Liberian population. 23  And, as in other colonial contexts, the Americo-
Liberian elites were able to gain access to the lands of the indigenous people 
by negotiating land contracts in exchange for foreign luxury goods and 
conquest.24  Before the arrival of the Americo-Liberians, these groups 
previously had had contact with white people principally for trade purposes.25 
 It is now a common understanding that the Americo-Liberians (some 
descendants of freed Black American slaves and others descendants of 
captured Africans who were intercepted during their trans-Atlantic passage) 
founded the state of Liberia upon the perceived superiority of the light-
skinned elite over the darker-skinned natives.26  The only difference between 
the colonial context in Liberia and that in other West African countries 
appears to be that the founders of Liberia were Black.27  Even though the 
Americo-Liberians never comprised more than 5% of the Liberian population, 
they ruled for nearly forty years through an elite oligarchy that excluded and 
                                                 
 20 PHAM, supra note 1, at 12.  
 21 Id. at 5-11.  
 22 Id. at 17.   
 23 OSAGHAE, supra note 19; PHAM supra note 1, at 12.  These sixteen ethnic 
groups are divided between three ethno-linguistic groups: the Mel, the Mande, and the 
Kwa.  The Mande are divided into eight ethnic groups, the Kwa into six, and the Mel 
into two.  PHAM, supra note 1, at 12.  The Mel are concentrated in the northwest of 
the country.  The Kwa have historically been coastal seafearing people and were often 
recruited to assist European traders and sailors sailing in local waters.  Id.  The Mel 
and Mande speaking peoples had contacts with Europeans dating back to the 
seventeenth century; their chieftains traded African slaves for Western commodities.  
Id. 
 24 See OSAGHAE, supra note 19, at 29-31. 
 25 See PHAM, supra note 1 at 12.  
 26 IKECHI MGBEOJI, COLLECTIVE INSECURITY: THE LIBERIAN CRISIS, 
UNILATERALISM, & GLOBAL ORDER 5, 7 (2003).  
 27 See, e.g., OSAGHAE, supra note 19, at, 28, 31, 42 (affirming the 
appropriateness of the use of the colonial model to describe rule by Americo-
Liberians-a peripheralised ruling class which lacks an independent material base and 
which is consistently challenged from within as a hegemonic class).   
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oppressed the indigenous Liberians.28  In fact, all twenty-one Liberian 
presidents with the exception of Samuel K. Doe have been Americo-
Liberian.29   
 Recognizing that the state had to have some method of controlling the 
indigenous people, the Americo-Liberians ruled through a colonial idiom of 
power: the indirect rule system. 30   This was a system “where the central 
government would recognize the preexisting tribal [authority] structures [by 
granting] local rulers control over their subjects in exchange for 
[collaboration] with Monrovia,” the capital.31  Liberia’s interior territories 
were divided into districts with preexisting ethnic and cultural allegiances in 
mind.32  Within the districts, “the chiefs were [to be] chosen according to 
traditional custom” with final approval in the hands of a district 
commissioner.33  As long as there was no conflict with the central 
government, the district commissioners were to uphold the traditional power 
of chiefs over their peoples.34  The primary duty of the chief vis-à-vis 
Monrovia was the collection of valuable taxes and provision of free labor to 
the government.35  Even though there was moderate inclusion of indigenous 
people into Liberian mainstream society through the indirect rule system, it 
was not until the 1940s that the indigenous were allowed the benefits of 
Liberian citizenship.36  This social context coupled with declining economic 
prospects would soon become a major grievance for many Liberians.   
 Like other colonial states, Liberia had the potential to be an economic 
leader throughout West Africa, but the government’s economic practices have 
led to a continual drain of the country’s resources.  In addition to one-sided 
contracts with the United States, Liberia entered into abusive loan agreements 
and contracts with several international lending institutions.37  Customs duties 
and tax revenues were often pledged as security for loan repayment.38  
Furthermore, coercive and one-sided dealings between Liberian elites and 
foreign companies, such as granting of exclusive mineral rights, and securing 
                                                 
 28 ADEBAJO, supra note 16, at 45-46; PHAM, supra note 1, at 14. 
 29 Samuel K. Ngaima, Liberian Civil War, 27 FUTURICS 102, 106 (2003).  
 30 OLIVER & ATMORE, supra note 17 at 190; PHAM, supra note 1, at 31.  
 31 PHAM, supra note 1, at 31 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. at 31.  
 34 Id.  
 35 Id. at 32 
 36 Id.  
 37 Id. at 35 
 38 Id. 
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loans using future customs revenues and duty free imports, contributed to 
Liberia’s declining economic prospects.39   
 One concrete example of bad economic practice has been Liberia’s 
manner of exploiting its rubber.  Rubber has always been Liberia’s key 
resource but Liberia’s relationship with the United States has virtually ruined 
the potential for that resource to benefit the country.  The United States’ 
relationship to the Liberian rubber industry began when the United States 
became the world’s leading consumer in rubber, at which time it used 
Liberian rubber plantations to exploit the rubber used to meet the demands of 
America’s expanding automobile industry.40  However, the agreements 
between Liberia and the Firestone Rubber and Tire Company were not the 
fairest in their terms.41  One such agreement granted Firestone a ninety-nine 
year lease on a Liberian plantation for a $1 an acre rent for the first year and a 
flat $6,000 per year rent thereafter.42   
 The social and economic problems in Liberia – including its declining 
economic prospects and the inability of the elite to integrate the indigenous 
people – continued from its founding through the 1970s, when Liberia’s 
problems were further exacerbated.43  Liberia reached a breaking point 
following the imposition of rice subsidies, Liberia’s staple food, in 1979.44  
The effect of the rice subsidies was an increase in the price of rice to a sum 
representing more than one-third of the monthly income for an average 
Liberian family.45  The price increase sparked campaigns of protest and civil 
disobedience.  Amadu Sesay argues that the rice riots of 1979 marked a 
turning point in Liberia.46  The incident left then-President Tolbert weakened 
and the dominant political party of Liberia, the True Whig Party, split.47  In 
the meantime, indigenous political opposition quickly formed and demanded 
concessions, such as having the right to register as political parties to 
challenge the upcoming elections.48  When Tolbert decided to push back the 
1980 elections, the scene was set for the coup led by Samuel Doe, an 
                                                 
 39 Id. at 32-41. 
 40 Id.at 38-39 
 41 Id. at 37-41; See also, OSAGHAE, supra note 19 at 40 (implying that Firestone 
was more of an exploiter than an investor).  
 42 PHAM, supra note 1, at 39. 
 43 MGBEOII, supra note 26, at 2, 11.  
 44 Id. at 11. 
 45 PHAM, supra note 1, at 76. 
 46 DR AMADU SESAY, Historical Background to the Liberian Crisis in THE 
LIBERIAN CRISIS: A PHOTOGRAPHIC EXPEDITION (1992).  
 47 PHAM, supra note 1, at 76-77; OSAGHAE, supra note 19, at 56-60.  
 48 PHAM, supra note 1, at 76-77; OSAGHAE, supra note 19, at 56-60. 
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indigenous low-ranking soldier, that would break the domination of the 
Americo-Liberian elites.49   
B. Indigenous Rule under President Doe 
 Instead of reversing the course of Liberian history, the Samuel Doe 
regime followed suit in 1980.  Doe did not bring democracy, equality, or long 
term economic stability to the country.50  Instead he became the one of the 
most repressive Liberian leaders in its history, ruling through an idiom of 
divide and destroy.51  Doe contributed to the ethnicization of the Liberian 
army by filling the most important military positions with people of the Krahn 
ethnic group (Doe’s own group) and purging the army of Gios and Manos.52  
He also alienated other political and social groups by disproportionately 
representing Krahn and Mandingo people in government positions.53   
 Though Doe was weak as a leader, foreign support heavily bolstered 
his regime.  The Reagan administration embraced him as a line of defense 
against the Soviets during the Cold War.54  In fact, the Liberian government 
was the largest recipient of U.S. aid in Sub-Saharan Africa by the time Doe 
was inaugurated, such aid representing roughly one third of the Liberian 
government’s revenues.55  Between 1981 and 1985, U.S. economic and 
military assistance to Liberia totaled over $500 million.56  Nonetheless, 
Liberia’s international debt under Doe rose from $750 million to $1.4 
billion.57  Even though the Liberian government was particularly repressive, 
the United States continued to aid Liberia to prevent Doe from turning to 
Libya and the Soviet Union.58  The support that Liberia received from the 
United States quickly withered after the Cold War.59  Some argue that it was 
the combination of widespread corruption, the decline in revenues from 
                                                 
 49 PHAM, supra note 1, at 78-79; OSAGHAE, supra note 19 at 60-65. 
 50 ADEBAJO, supra note 16, at 45-46 (citing Doe’s instigation of ethnic rivalries); 
OSAGHAE, supra note 19, at 66 (citing instances of political repression under Doe); 
PHAM, supra note 1, at 90-91 (arguing that Doe failed to maintain productive 
economic relationships with the United States, the IMF, or the World Bank). 
 51 ADEBAJO, supra note 16, at 44- 45. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id.  
 54 PHAM, supra note 1, at 88-89. 
 55 PHAM, supra note 1, at 89.  
 56 Id. 
 57 OSAGHAE, supra note 19, at 74-77. 
 58 PHAM, supra note 1, at 88. 
 59 PHAM, supra note 1, at 226. 
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Liberia’s main exports (rubber, timber, and iron ore), and the cessation of the 
U.S. economic assistance that caused the out-break of civil war in 1989.60   
C. The Effects of Charles Taylor’s War Without End: Civil War 1989-
1997, 2001-2003 
 Although few writers have dealt sufficiently with the causes of the 
Liberian conflict,61 readily identifiable factors contributed to the first conflict 
in Liberia which brought Charles Taylor to the presidency in 1997.  The 
internal factors included:  
(1) the legacy of the Americo-Liberian insistence on total social, 
political, and economic exclusion of the Liberian indigenous 
population from Liberian society;  
(2) the subsequent reliance of Doe on ethnic mistrust to divide the 
Liberian people;  
(3) natural resource exploitation without economic development; and  
(4) the proliferation of competitive warlord factions.62   
External factors included the ineffectiveness of the international community 
in coming to the aid of the Liberian people earlier, the dominance of the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) as the only 
regional organization to come to the aid of Liberia, and the interference of 
contiguous states in Liberian affairs.63  These conditions allowed the half-
indigenous, half-Americo-Liberian warlord, Charles Taylor, to control the 
war-time scene in Liberia.   
 Charles Taylor’s seven-year civil war resulted in his ascendancy to 
the Presidency, and was successful for several key reasons.  First, 
factionalism prevented other groups from becoming powerful enough to win 
the strategic battles, and Taylor gained access to more resources than the other 
factions.64  In fact, Liberia’s resources probably provided more incentive to 
continue the war than any political goal of these factions.65  Battles were 
fought for control of areas rich in economic resources—gold, diamond, 
                                                 
 60 ADEBAJO, supra note 16, at 46. 
 61 Ngaima, supra note 29, at 103.  
 62 Id.at 103, 106-07; Yekutiel Gershoni, War Without End and an End to a War: 
The Prolonged Wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone, 40 AFR. STUD. REV. 55 (1997).   
 63 See ADEBAJO, supra note 16, at 48-49 (citing the damaging of effect of 
interference by contiguous states); MGBEOJI, supra note 26, at 59-70 (discussing the 
critiques of ECOWAS intervention in the Liberian crisis); PHAM, supra note 1, at 
203-206 (explaining that the foreign policy of the United States to Liberia has been 
one of benign neglect).  
 64 ADEBAJO, supra note 16, at 66-67; PHAM, supra note 1, at 120-124, 173; 
Gershoni, supra note 52, at 55-76.  
 65 ADEBAJO, supra note 16, at 47. 
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timber, iron ore, rubber, and tree crops.66  Taylor individually may have 
derived $75 million annually from these exports.67   
Second, regional actors greatly influenced Taylor’s consolidation of 
power.  Countries that aligned themselves with the Taylor regime were also 
rewarded.  Through Cote d’Ivoire, Taylor had access to bases and commercial 
interests.68  Burkina Faso lent soldiers.69  Libyan President Muammar Qaddafi 
also supported Taylor.70   
 Taylor’s 1997 victory did not successfully convert him from a 
warlord to a statesman.  After several peace talks and treaties, Taylor agreed 
to a ceasefire in virtual exchange for the presidency.71  Some suggest that 
Taylor was voted into office for fear that he would cause more fighting if he 
was not.72  But Taylor’s presidential rule was short-lived.73  Only five years 
after Liberia began a transition to peace, the country erupted once again into 
civil war.74  Taylor ruled by centralizing power through the reward of loyalists 
and through the intimidation of critics.75  High-ranking officials misused state 
power to further their own political objectives.76  Similarly, Taylor and his 
partners monopolized profitable businesses like fuel and food, and gained 
from imports.77  State institutions, including the judiciary, the legislature, the 
human rights commission, and the commission on reconciliation, remained 
weak under Taylor.78   
 Signs of a second civil war began to show in 1999 when rebels 
crossed into Liberia from Guinea.  Liberians United for Reconciliation and 
Democracy (LURD) and Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) 
                                                 
 66 Id.  
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. at 48. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. 
 71 PHAM, supra note 1, at 173; ADEBAJO, supra note 16, at 65.  
 72 PHAM, supra note 1, at 134.   
 73 Id. at 215. 
 74 Id. at 182 
 75 Id. at 178-79. 
 76 Human Rights Watch, Back to the Brink: War Crimes by Liberian Government 
and Rebels: A Call for Greater International Attention to Liberia and the Sub-region, 
at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/liberia/liberia0402.pdf. (last visited Mar. 7, 2005) 
[hereinafter HRW Back to the Brink]. 
 77 Jamie O’Connell, Here Interest Meets Humanity: How to End the War and 
Support Reconstruction in Liberia, and the Case for Modest American Leadership, 17 
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 213 (2004). 
 78 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2003:  Liberia (2003), supra note 3, at 48.  
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waged war to unseat Taylor in 2000.79  In many ways, LURD and MODEL 
are new names for old factions.  LURD was formed by Liberian exiles in 
response to feelings of frustration and perceived exclusion from the 
implementation of the Abuja Peace Accords that ended the first civil war.80   
D. Sierra Leone’s Civil War: Comparing Civil Wars 
 The origins of Liberia and Sierra Leone follow similar patterns.81  The 
crises of these countries are so intertwined that some scholars doubt that 
peace can exist in one locale if it does not exist in the other.82   
 Sierra Leone began as the Freetown Colony, founded in 1792 by a 
private group of British philanthropists-- the Sierra Leone Company-- as a 
haven for freed Black slaves.83  The company managed the Freetown 
settlement until the corporation was dissolved in 1808.84  Sierra Leone then 
became a crown colony and continued to receive assistance from Britain.  
Sierra Leone received its independence in 1961.85   
 Though the beginnings and causes of Sierra Leone’s civil war are due 
to more than the encouragement of Charles Taylor, the fact that the same 
players have operated in both states suggests a strong linkage.  During 
Liberia’s first civil war, Taylor used Sierra Leone’s diamond fields in the 
north of the country as a source of income for his own military operation, and 
supported the new Sierra Leonean rebel movement, the Revolutionary United 
Front (RUF), led by Taylor’s friend Foday Sankoh.86  Sankoh’s troops entered 
Sierra Leone on March 23, 1991, beginning the civil war in Sierra Leone that 
lasted for eleven years and resulted in the death of tens of thousands of 
people.  Sierra Leone’s civil war was primarily a war over resources.87 
 As a result of Taylor’s support for rebels in Sierra Leone, the 
governments of both Sierra Leone and Guinea began to organize Liberian 
                                                 
 79 Human Rights Watch, Liberia (2004) at 
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/01/21/liberi6977.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2005).  
 80 Danny Hoffman, The Civilian Target in Sierra Leone and Liberia:  Political 
Power, Military Strategy and Humanitarian Intervention, AFR. AFF. 103, 215 (2004).   
 81 For a history of the eleven year civil war in Sierra Leone and Liberia’s 
influence, see Celina Schocken, The Special Court for Sierra Leone: Overview and 
Recommendations, 20 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 436 (2002) 
 82 See Levi Woodward, U.N. Report: Taylor’s Liberia and the U.N.’s 
Involvement, 19. N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 923, 932, 938 (2003).  
 83 PHAM, supra note 1, at 156. 
 84 Id. at 157. 
 85 Id.  
 86 Id. at 159-161 
 87 LEONARD & STRAUS, supra note 4, at 69-70. 
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refugees inside their borders to fight against Taylor’s National Patriotic Front 
of Liberia (NPFL).88  In Liberia’s second civil war, the rebel group, LURD 
was a group of Liberian dissidents composed of both Liberians and Sierra 
Leoneans who did not support Taylor’s alliance with the RUF.89  The Sierra 
Leonean component of LURD, the “kamajor militia,” fought for the 
government of Sierra Leone against Sankoh’s troops in the Sierra Leonean 
war, and also played a part in Liberia’s second civil war.90   
E.  Abuses Committed in Sierra Leone and Liberia 
 Numerous organizations have documented the abuses from both wars 
in Sierra Leone and Liberia.91  The abuses committed might fall into three 
categories under international law:  war crimes, crimes against humanity, and 
other serious human rights abuses.92  Addressing Sierra Leone first, abuses 
committed included rape, murder, abduction, and forced labor.93  All parties 
used children and youth to carry out human rights violations.94   
 In Liberia, there were widespread rapes, massacres, mutilation, 
torture, forced conscription of child combatants, and cannibalism.95  Liberians 
committed human rights violations in the Sierra Leonean territory as well.96  
Danny Hoffman, a cultural anthropologist who studied rebels and government 
fighters who moved in and out of the Sierra Leone and Liberian wars, has 
                                                 
 88 Survivors’ Rights International, SRI Background Alert: Liberia, at 
http://www.survivorsrightsinternational.org/ms_word_files/liberiabackgrounden.org 
(last visited Mar. 7, 2005). 
 89 SRI Country Briefing:  Liberia, supra note 10 at 10. 
 90 Id. 
 91see Human Rights Watch available at www.hrw.org; Refugees International, 
available at http://www.refugeesinternational.org/cgi-bin/ri/index; International Crisis 
Group available at http://www.crisisweb.org/home/index.cfm; Amnesty International 
available at www.amnesty.org.  
 92 The crime against humanity comprises grave offenses, such as murder, 
deportation, and torture as well as persecution based on political, racial, and religious 
grounds.  These crimes transcend the national boundaries and they violate the law of 
all nations.   
 93 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2002, Sierra Leone (2002), at 
http://hrw.org/wr2k2/africa10.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2005) [hereinafter HRW:  
World Report 2002, Sierra Leone].  
 94 See generally, Human Rights Watch, How to Fight, How to Kill:  Child 
Soldiers in Liberia (2004)  at http://hrw.org/reports/2004/liberia0204/, (last visited 
Apr. 10, 2005);  Human Rights Watch, Sierra Leone:  Getting Away with Murder, 
Mutilation, and Rape (1999), at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/sierra/ (last visited 
Apr. 10, 2005). 
 95 Corinne Dufka, Liberia:  Do Not Forget the Crimes, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Feb 
6. 2004,  at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/02/06/liberi7280.htm.  
 96 See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, Back to the Brink, supra note 76.  
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explained the phenomenon of atrocities against civilians as a military tactic 
that employed the following reasoning:  “When the international community 
responds to African crises, the more atrocious the conflict, the greater the 
level of aid.”97  Again, this wartime economy profited rebels and rebel leaders 
more than the legitimate state economic system.98   
 In the Liberian context, some have noted the religious and cultic 
aspects of certain killings.99  Pham reports that all sides during the conflict in 
Liberia employed the power of traditional beliefs and symbols in an attempt 
to reinforce the morale of supporters and to encourage fear in opponents.100  
During the first civil war, Charles Taylor cultivated the support of the 
indigenous religious cults of Liberia.101  After the first civil war, reports 
surfaced of ritual cannibalism; many Monrovians believe that even Charles 
Taylor participated in the human sacrifices.102   
                                                 
 97 See generally, Hoffman, supra note 80, at 211-226.  Hoffman explains that the 
Kamajor Militia, Sierra Leoneon government fighters employed to contain the rebels 
during the Sierra Leonean civil war, became increasingly disillusioned with the DDR 
(disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration) campaign at the end of the Sierra 
Leone war because RUF fighters were rewarded with incentive packages, job 
training, and reintegration benefits, while the kamajors were not rewarded for their 
work in defense of the established order.  Id. The result was that the Sierra Leonean 
Kamajors and Liberian dissidents formed the Liberian rebel movement LURD that 
led the attacks in the second Liberian civil war.  Id.  Hoffman sees the tactics used by 
LURD as much more deadly and civilian targeted than the attacks used by the same 
kamajor fighters in Sierra Leone, which for him was an indication that being a rebel 
has its pay off.  Id. 
 98 See LEONARD & STRAUS, supra note 4, at 68-70.  
 99 PHAM, supra note 1, at 64-7. Several scholars have devoted attention to ancient 
religious societies in Liberian culture.  See e.g., ELLIS, supra note 3, at 220-280 
(connecting war, power, and the spiritual order).  The central government of Liberia 
has never been able to assert its control over the Poro and the Sande societies, that 
play the role in transmission of traditional lore and initiation of indigenous Liberians.  
Id.  These religious cults were popular before the creation of the state and during the 
Americo-Liberian rule.  Today, even practicing Christians are initiated into these 
societies.  During his rule, President Barclay attempted to eradicate this aspect of 
Liberian society by jailing certain ringleaders.  Members of these societies have killed 
and consumed individuals, raided towns, and brought human flesh to market for sale.  
In 1952 President Tubman passed a law creating a post of secretary of the interior 
charged with overseeing matters pertaining to these indigenous societies.   Yet 
President Tolbert, Tubman’s successor, President Doe and President Taylor were all 
initiated into these cults.  PHAM, supra note 1, at 64-7.  
 100 Id. at 66. 
 101 Id. at 63-67 
 102 Id. at 67.  
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 In Sierra Leone the war officially ended when the RUF signed a 
peace agreement with the Government of Sierra Leone on July 7, 1999, to end 
the civil war;103 but the war on the ground continued until 2000 when Foday 
Sankoh was captured and the RUF began to hand over their weapons.104  In 
Liberia, Charles Taylor agreed to meet in the Ghanaian capital of Accra to 
discuss a peace plan, until he fled when an indictment for his arrest was issued 
during the peace talks.105  Although the peace plan was implemented, Taylor 
is currently in exile in Nigeria.106  Recent evidence indicates that Taylor is 
still receiving money from his supporters in Liberia, possibly to incite future 
rebellions.107 
II.   
FAILED STATES AND THE CULTURE OF IMPUNITY 
 Liberia, as a failed state, is plagued by leaders who rule through a 
culture of impunity.  Sierra Leone has a similar history, and it too has been 
characterized as a failed state.108  The civil wars that plagued both of these 
countries were caused by a complete break-down in the elites’ ability to 
assure the security of their countries.  As a result, rebels and several 
governmental figures were able to carry out war on the ground, take control of 
key state resources, and commit grave human rights violations.  Despite years 
of war, both Sierra Leone and Liberia were able to end “official” violence in 
their countries through careful negotiations of peace accords with these rebels, 
elite politicians and select members of civil society.   
 In this Part I make two points.  First, the focus on negotiated peace 
agreements in Liberia illustrates the problems Liberia faces as a modern state.  
As Susan Ackerman has aptly stated: “[T]he options for law reform [in states 
created in the aftermath of violent internal conflicts] may be limited by the 
very process that permits the state to exist in the first place.”109  In other 
                                                 
 103 Lome Accord, Annex, supra note 11.  
 104 PHAM, supra note 1, at 167. 
 105 Kathy Ward, Might v. Right:  Charles Taylor and the Sierra Leone Special 
Court, 11 No. 1 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 8 (2003) 
 106 Agence France Press, Charles Taylor:  Exiled but Still Pulling Strings (Oct. 
21, 2003)  at 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/liberia/2003/1012strings.htm.  
 107 The Analyst, Taylor’s Money Trail Raises Eyebrows (Dec. 17, 2004) at 
http://allafrica.com/stories/200412170160.html.(last visited Mar. 12, 2005). 
 108 ROBERT I. ROTBERG, The Failure and Collapse of Nation-States:  Breakdown, 
Prevention, and Repair, in WHEN STATES FAIL: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 11 
(Robert Rotberg ed., 2004) ( [hereinafter ROTBERG , WHEN STATES FAIL]. 
 109 Susan Rose-Ackerman, Establishing the Rule of Law in WHEN STATES FAIL: 
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES, 211 (2004) 
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words, law reform is limited by the negotiated peace.  These peace 
agreements place the majority of their focus on neutralizing rebel groups, 
while seemingly turning a blind eye to elite sponsored violence, the real threat 
to peace and stability in Liberia.  In this way, the negotiations have failed to 
account for the history that has brought Liberia where it is today.   
 Second, the agreements should reflect the lessons learned in Sierra 
Leone.  Sierra Leone also initially privileged diplomacy over justice in its 
peace negotiations, but later took the important step to pursue human rights 
violators in court upon realizing that the Lome Peace Accord and other peace-
keeping efforts had failed.110   
 While the agreements offend abstract notions of social justice, the 
drafters of these agreements claim that they are the only way to end armed 
conflict.  Yet even with this tension, these agreements may contain a solution 
to Liberia’s problems.  Through careful redrafting, these agreements could 
recognize that legal mechanisms crafted to change the nature of elite power 
over the Liberian state can end the culture of impunity.   
A.  Colonial Origins of the Culture of Impunity and the Failed State 
Phenomenon 
 The categorization of Liberia as a failed state, evidenced by the 
complete lack of security provided by the state for its inhabitants and its 
concomitant submission to a culture of impunity, is directly related to its 
quasi-colonial origins and its neo-colonial governmental structure.111  
                                                 
 110 Ward, supra note 105, at 8. 
 111 It is always difficult to provide a complete definition for a term that sums up 
so much.  Recognizing the need to define key terminology, however, I rely on the 
work of Robert Rotberg, Director of the Kennedy School of Government’s Program 
on Intrastate Conflict and President of the World Peace Foundation’s characterization 
of a failed state.  ROTBERG, WHEN STATES FAIL, supra note 108 at 5-9.  First, and 
most importantly, Rotberg ranks states according to certain performance criteria.  Id. 
at 2.  Starting from the premise that nation-states exist to provide a decentralized 
method of delivering political goods to persons living within designated parameters, 
Rotberg provides the following performance criteria as a means to measure the ability 
of states to provide political goods:  (1)  human security (to prevent cross-border 
invasions and infiltrations, and any loss of territory; to eliminate domestic threats to 
or attacks upon the national order and social structure; to prevent crime and any 
related dangers to domestic human security; and to enable citizens to resolve their 
differences with the state and with their fellow inhabitants without recourse to arms or 
other forms of physical coercion); (2)  codes and procedures that comprise an 
enforceable body of law, security of property and inviolable contracts, an effective 
judicial system, and a set of norms that legitimate and validate the values embodied in 
a local version of the rule of law; (3)  essential freedoms (e.g. the right to participate 
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Therefore, we cannot examine the modern state of Liberia without looking 
more closely at the colonial form of rule in Liberia.  Establishing the 
historical framework is crucial because even though a primary cause of state 
failure is destructive leadership that is, the avaricious policies of all of the 
Presidents of Liberia, the history of colonial rule in Liberia and the influence 
of the colonial period in Africa paved the way for this culture of impunity.112  
 Liberia is no different from the other failed states in Africa in the 
sense that its leaders made destructive decisions that paved the way to state 
failure.  Other examples include President Mobutu Sese Seko’s three-plus 
decades of kleptocratic rule that “sucked Zaire (now the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, or DRC) dry” until he was deposed in 1997.113  In Sierra Leone, 
President Siaka Stevens (1967-85) systematically plundered his tiny country 
and institutionalized disorder.114  President Mohamed Siad Barre (1969-91) 
did the same in Somalia.115  These rulers were personally greedy, but as 
predatory leaders they also licensed and sponsored the avarice of others, thus 
preordaining the destruction of their states.  All of these countries, including 
Liberia, have shared the experience of colonial rule, and for this reason I will 
explain how colonial rule can directly cause a state to collapse.  Liberia is a 
unique case of state failure, however, because of its origins and its particular 
claim of emblematic African democracy. 
 The culture of impunity that has contributed to state failure in Africa 
in general and in Liberia in particular grew directly out of the colonial 
institution of indirect rule.  In short, the colonial institution of indirect rule 
gave birth to the notion that it is acceptable to rule over people through 
                                                                                                                    
in politics and compete for office); and (4)  other goods such as medical and health 
care; schools and educational instruction; roads; communications networks; a money 
and banking system; a beneficent fiscal and institutional context within which citizens 
can pursue personal entrepreneurial goals; space for the flowering of civil society, etc.  
Id. at 2-5.  Second, Rotberg emphasizes that political goods two through four only 
become possible when a reasonable measure of security is guaranteed.  Id. at 3.  
Third, a failed state is one where violence consumes the state, where regimes prey on 
their constituents, where the state has no control of peripheral regions, where there is 
a state of lawlessness that develops in the state in reaction to the state’s own criminal 
behavior, and where the state can only provide limited quantities of other essential 
political goods.  Id. at 5-9.  Fourth, a failed state does offer economic opportunity, but 
only for the ruling elites, hence the term "corruption." Id. at 8.   
 112 Id. at 11 
 113 Robert I. Rotberg, Failed States in a World of Terror, 81 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 4, 
127-40 (2002). 
 114 Id. 
 115 Id.  
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illegitimate forms of control.116  This birth of illegitimacy during the colonial 
era has carried over into the post-colonial modern nation-state.   
 The most obvious and long-lasting failure of the colonial state has 
been its engendering of modern forms of inequality—a liberal government in 
form, but class division in fact.  Although colonialism claimed to bring 
civilization to the “native savage,” the post-colonial theorist Aime Cesaire 
argues that colonialism as a system of rule was not a “question of eliminating 
the inequalities among men but of widening them and making them into a 
law.”117  This phenomenon is best illustrated through a description of the 
colonial mode of control: 
Here, the land remained a communal—“customary”—
possession. . . .The tribal leadership was either selectively 
reconstituted as the hierarchy of the local state or freshly 
imposed where none had existed as in “stateless 
societies.”  Here political inequality went alongside civil 
inequality.  Both were grounded in a legal dualism.  
Alongside received law was implemented a customary 
law that regulated non-market relations, in land, in 
personal (family), and in community affairs.  For the 
subject population of natives, indirect rule signified a 
mediated—decentralized—despotism.118   
 The manipulation of tribal leadership and the imposition of a two-
tiered system of law in African colonies meant that African societies were 
organized differently in rural areas from urban ones, thus producing a “Janus-
faced” or bifurcated state.119  “It contained a duality:  two forms of power 
under a single hegemonic authority” where urban power spoke the language 
of civil society and civil rights, rural power of community and culture.120  
Native chiefs and commissioners dispensed customary justice while white 
magistrates dispensed modern justice to non-natives.121  Yet the development 
of the political center at the expense of the periphery meant that there would 
be no way for the rural to hold accountable the leadership developing in the 
center. 
                                                 
 116  When I use the term "illegitimate," I simply mean through forms not 
necessarily approved of by the society where the ruling is taking place.   
 117 AIME CESAIRE, DISCOURS SUR LE COLONIALISME 37 (Joan Pinkham trans., 
Monthly Review Press, 2000) (1955). 
 118 MAHMOOD MAMDANI, CITIZEN AND SUBJECT:  DECENTRALIZED DESPOTISM 
AND THE LEGACY OF LATE COLONIALISM 17 (1996). 
 119 Id at  18 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. at 109. 
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 The independence of African countries was successful in the sense 
that African states finally were able to exercise their right of self-
determination.122  Independence, however, failed in two important ways:  in 
the manner that power was transferred to the indigenous rulers, and in the way 
that it left Africa largely underdeveloped.123  Most post-colonial independent 
African states inherited from their colonial rulers, whatever their limitations, a 
‘framework’ of internal and external security, efficient and disinterested 
administration, sound finance, a basic economic infrastructure of roads, 
railways and harbors, and at least the beginnings of modern social services in 
education, health, and community development.124  Yet between colonization 
and independence there was no effort made to create a legitimate core of 
properly trained leaders who could then build on these colonial frameworks.  
 The colonial trend of developing frameworks of states instead of real 
states and investing in weak material structures characterized by mono-
cultural and externally-oriented economies in Africa led to authoritarian rule 
that facilitated the monopolization of both political power and economic 
activities by the metropolitan bourgeoisie and the successor national 
bourgeoisie.125  This occurred because the indirect rule system never 
attempted to make the center of colonial states accountable to territories 
outside of the capital.   
 An example of how African states were manipulated at the expense of 
the masses to the benefit of European powers and a small elite core may be 
useful.  The colonial system was first and foremost an economic system 
whereby the metropole (the colonizing state) sought an economic advantage 
through its colonization of the periphery state.126  African countries were 
industrialized during the colonial period to the extent that private foreign 
companies were integrated into African economic systems under a 
management system that operated to the complete benefit of the metropole.127   
 First, private companies often forced unequal exchange upon African 
countries, in that there were major differences between the prices of African 
exports of raw materials and their importation of manufactured goods.128  The 
                                                 
 122 OLIVER & ATMORE, supra note 17, at 266.  
 123 ROTBERG,  WHEN STATES FAIL: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES, supra note 108, 
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colonial state could guarantee optimal conditions under which private 
companies could exploit African countries because of the sheer political and 
military supremacy of the colonizing force.129  Recall, for example, the 
Firestone Agreements in Liberia.130  Although Liberia was blessed with 
rubber as a natural resource, the United States completely controlled the 
industry.131  Historian Walter Rodney explains that this control was reinforced 
by a massive military presence of Americans in Liberia.132  Rodney further 
explains that the rubber production in Liberia symbolized the colonial 
phenomenon of “growth without development” where “there was growth of 
the so-called enclave import-export sector, but the only things which 
developed were dependency and underdevelopment.”133 
 Second, by the end of the colonial period, these fragile state structures 
could no longer stand without the financial support of the colonial state.134  
These states had no ability to act independently because they were left 
politically, economically, and militarily weak.  Often the African leaders who 
were chosen to succeed the colonial state were no more than puppets installed 
to ensure that the colonial metropole would continue to benefit even after the 
end of the colonial era.135   
 During its the colonial period, Liberian elites implemented a system 
of indirect rule to facilitate easy communication between the capital city of 
Monrovia and the hinterland where most indigenous Liberian people lived.136  
In many ways this indirect rule system implemented under Liberia’s period of 
Black colonialism was no less patronizing and demeaning than European 
forms of colonialism.137  The Liberian elites who first ruled Liberia were the 
colonizers, and their successors, Americo-Liberians and those of indigenous 
origin, ruled through the same colonial mechanisms as those employed by 
European colonizers.138  Under Americo-Liberian domination, the hinterland 
Liberians acted as implementing agents for the Monrovian government.139  
Even after indigenous Liberians became more integrated into Liberian 
                                                 
 129 Id. at 164. 
 130 PHAM, supra note 1, at 37-41.  
 131 Id. at 193.  
 132 Id. at 198.  
 133 Id. at 234.  
 134 Id. at 225.  
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 136 See Id. at 31-32.  
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 138 See OSAGHAE, supra note 19 at 23.  
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society, the countryside was never developed to their benefit.  Rather, the 
hinterland was opened up solely for exploitation by foreign investors.140  A 
system of patronage flourished where access to the country’s resources was 
granted to a few, usually those connected to the heads of state or government 
officials by kinship lines or some other connection.141  Appointments and 
promotions in the civil services, the police forces, the judiciary, and the state 
corporations became subject to party patronage.142  Liberia fits well in this 
description of the colonial influence on African states. 
 The question that remains is how the culture of impunity grew from 
this history.  I define the culture of impunity as the conscious decision by 
leaders who have inherited these weak state structures to turn their backs on 
the problems of the post-colonial state, and instead find ways to benefit from 
impoverishment and misery of the people over which they rule.  The culture 
of impunity is the particular method through which rulers, particularly those 
in African states, use the fragile post-colonial state as a personal withdrawal 
account without ever reinvesting.  In these states there is an absence of 
investigation, justice, or punishment.  There is always the potential to commit 
crimes without having to face punishment, and implicit approval of the 
morality of these crimes.  Thus, there is the idea that what is done without any 
punishment can be repeated without fear.  Other characteristics of this culture 
include skimming from the state treasury, restricting participatory processes, 
and distancing of the ruling families from their subjects.143   
 
 In other words, it does not matter to these leaders that their state has 
in fact failed.144  Robert Rotberg, one of the leading scholars of failed states, 
explains that even when a state is weak, failing, failed or collapsed, ruling 
“families and cadres arrogate to themselves increasing portions of the 
available pie.”145  Rotberg suggests that “once greed has claimed the 
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behavioral goals of actors within failed states . . .  peace is harder to 
achieve.”146   
 The reality has often been that bad African leaders do not benefit 
financially from peace.147  Instead, their modus operandi is violence and 
manipulation of state resources.  On the political side of state failure, leaders 
and their associates often subvert prevailing democratic norms, coerce 
legislatures and bureaucracies into subservience, strangle judicial 
independence, block civil society, and gain control over security and defense 
forces.148  Charles Taylor and other rebel groups did this in 1996, when they 
threatened the outbreak of another civil war unless the Liberian people elected 
Taylor president and his and other rebel groups to key governmental 
offices.149  Only negotiation with Taylor could replace war.150  Another 
element that contributes to complete instability in failed states is that the 
leaders usually patronize an ethnic group, clan, class, or kin while causing 
other groups to feel excluded or discriminated against.151  Though the colonial 
state laid the foundation for the illegitimate African state, bad leaders solidify 
this illegitimacy.  Rotberg observes:   
In the last phase of failure, the states’ legitimacy 
crumbles.  Lacking meaningful or realistic democratic 
means of redress, protesters take to the streets or mobilize 
along ethnic, religious, or linguistic lines.  Because small 
arms and even more formidable weapons are cheap and 
easy to find, because historical grievances are readily 
remembered or manufactured, and because the spoils of 
separation, autonomy, or a total takeover are attractive, 
the potential for violent conflict grows exponentially as 
the states’ power and legitimacy recede.152 
 This culture of impunity as the primary symptom of state failure 
developed in Liberia despite the fact that it was by no means a resource-poor 
country.  Liberia has always been a resource-rich country, and with the proper 
development of its industries the country had the huge potential to flourish.153  
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To its detriment, however, Liberian leaders such as Samuel Doe, Prince 
Johnson, and Charles Taylor have failed to remedy its weak institutional 
capacity, instead preferring to support bureaucracies that have no sense of 
professional responsibility and that exist only to carry out the order of the 
executive and to oppress the citizens.154  It has not helped that the United 
States and the international community have dealt generously with successive 
Liberian governments even during times when it was clear that the 
government abused the aid funds received.155   
 International economic organizations recognized the potential for 
state failure in African states.  In the 1980s, these organizations promoted 
structural adjustment policies aimed at moving African economies away from 
state-run systems by placing businesses under private management and 
promoting deregulation.156  Yet the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
World Bank quickly acknowledged that these purely market-oriented 
economic policies were not effective in achieving sustainable economic 
development.157  This may be because mandated conditions were never 
enforced, causing the perpetuation of poor policies and the strengthening of 
elites.158   
 In the 1990s, the international community began to focus on good 
governance and democratization, key features of the rule of law, as the 
method to achieve economic development and growth.159   Organizations such 
as the World Bank began to define governance in ways that stressed the 
manner in which social resources are controlled to exercise political power 
and promote social and economic development.160  Similarly, the IMF began 
to emphasize the importance of good governance as a condition to 
assistance.161  These organizations now focus their attention on the role played 
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by governmental authorities in establishing a framework for economic activity 
and in deciding how the benefits of such activity are distributed.162  Even 
though a healthy amount of criticism exists about the goals of these 
organizations, their recent focus on governance has helped to reveal the 
essence of relations between those who govern and those who are governed in 
Africa.163   
 Of course, the leaders themselves may be the real source of instability 
and violence in African states.  The chain of logic that follows is simple:  the 
social contract that binds citizens and central governmental structures is 
forfeited when citizens believe leaders are illegitimate.  At this precise 
moment, citizens transfer their allegiances to communal warlords.164  This 
short explanation merely shows the difficult past that Liberia must face.   
 Let us examine the reasons the elites in a country like Liberia must 
experience a (legal and judicial) shock in order to move out of this post-
colonial phase.  Aime Cesaire provides one perspective on how a post-
colonial society should progress:  “It is a new society we must create, with the 
help of all our brother slaves, a society rich with all the productive power of 
modern times, warm with all the fraternity of olden days.”165  One target for 
change must be promotion of the reform of elites and the conception of ruling 
and power in Africa.  Ending the era of the old-guard politicians, promoting 
political leaders who are genuinely talented, and focusing on how to change 
the behavior of high ranking officials must form the heart of the project of 
democracy in African countries.  In Cesaire’s view, the dehumanizing effect 
of colonialism does not just create an animal out of the native but also out of 
the colonizer himself.166  Cesaire brings home the point that “no one colonizes 
innocently, that no one colonizes with impunity either; that a nation which 
colonizes” calls for its own punishment.167   
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B.  Sierra Leone and Liberia’s Peace Agreements:  Why the Peace 
Agreement Approach Furthers the Culture of Impunity 
 The above discussion leads to the conclusion that, to promote reform 
in countries like Liberia where there has been a history of state abuse, reform 
mechanisms should focus on the very actors that have historically 
implemented destructive state activities.  Unfortunately, the two peace 
agreements that officially ended the wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia did not 
serve this goal.  Instead, the agreements created an arrangement that will 
continue this culture of impunity.  As Peter Pham so aptly notes, parceling out 
government agencies in the name of peace “tie[s] the authority of leaders of 
the various political groups directly to their ability to let their subalterns 
exploit profitable opportunities at the expense of the state.”168  In this section, 
I show that although the peace agreements in both Sierra Leone and Liberia 
were nearly identical documents in the way that rebel groups were able to 
secure leadership over key governmental branches, Sierra Leone recognized 
this flaw and changed course upon failure of its agreement, ultimately 
implementing the SCSL.  To contrast, and despite recent breaches of its 
agreement Liberia has not decided to change course.169 
1.  Sierra Leone’s Lome Accord:  The First Path Taken 
 It is important to note that the Lome Accord is not the tool that has 
sustained peace in Sierra Leone.170  Nevertheless, the lessons that the Sierra 
Leonean government learned through its negotiation process are considered 
here.  
 The peace agreement that officially ended Sierra Leone’s eleven year 
civil war, the Lome Accord, signed in the Togolese capital Lome, was 
negotiated between the government of Sierra Leone and the RUF, Sierra 
Leone’s most infamous rebel group.171  The Lome Accord provided for the 
following:   
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1. a cease-fire between the warring parties and disarmament of the 
RUF;172   
2. complete amnesty to all combatants;173 
3. transition of the RUF into a political party;174 
4. allocation of official control over Sierra Leone’s diamond minds 
to Foday Sankoh by naming him chairman of strategic minerals, 
and  
5. establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission.175 
Significantly, the UN ultimately made a reservation that the amnesty could 
not cover international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war 
crimes, and other serious violations of international humanitarian law.176   
 The Lome Accord quickly unraveled.177  It assured a lucrative deal for 
Foday Sankoh, the most infamous rebel leader of the RUF, under which he 
was given complete control over the mineral resources that he exploited 
throughout the war.178  Yet instead of hastening peace, there were reports that 
Sankoh was again encouraging breaches of the agreement.179  Reports 
surfaced that the RUF continued to participate in the killing of UN 
peacekeepers and the capturing of others even after the signing of the Lome 
Peace.180  Some say that it was only the capture of Foday Sankoh and his 
subsequent death that saved the situation on the ground.181  Therefore, though 
the Lome Accord diplomatically sought to end the war by negotiating with 
rebel groups, this sequence of events suggests that it was not the negotiation 
that ended the hostilities, but rather the fortuitous death of the lead rebel.   
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 As part of the peace process, the government in Sierra Leone held 
public workshops and conferences with civil society engagement, helping to 
incorporate policies specifically addressing the needs of the Sierra Leonean 
people on their journey to reconciliation.182  From this process, the people of 
Sierra Leone implemented a Truth and Reconciliation Commission.183  
Though some commentators were skeptical about the TRC’s ability to fulfill 
its mandate due to administrative, staffing and financial difficulties, the TRC 
has been successful.184  Currently the government plans to implement the 
recommendations of the TRC report, disseminate the report, and set up a war 
victims’ reparation fund.185  Some have commended the TRC commissioners 
for their creation of a child-friendly version of the report, noting that this is 
the first time in the world that a child-friendly version of a Truth and 
Reconciliation Report has been produced.186   
 Finally, the Sierra Leonean government went one step further than the 
Lome Accord and the TRC.  Upon realizing that the Agreement did not go far 
enough to remedy elite violations, Sierra Leone entered into an agreement 
with the UN to form the SCSL, with the special mandate to try those most 
responsible for the violations during Sierra Leone’s war.187  Sierra Leone’s 
choice to include justice in its peace process is discussed later in this part.   
2.  Liberia’s Path to Peace?:  The Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
 As it stands, the CPA for Liberia articulates the structure and scope 
for a transition government to prepare Liberia for democratic elections in 
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2005.188  The National Transition Government of Liberia (NTGL) led by 
Chairman Gyude Bryant, a respected Liberian businessman, is scheduled to 
operate for two years from October 14, 2003 to October 25, 2005, at which 
time elections will be held for the next Liberian President.189  The mandate of 
the NTGL will not expire until January 2006, when the next elected 
government of Liberia will be inaugurated.190 
 The ten most important provisions of the agreement are:   
(1) the call for a total and permanent end to hostilities between the 
Government of Liberia, MODEL and LURD;191   
(2) establishing ceasefire monitoring and ensuring the security of 
senior political and military leaders;192   
(3) United Nations Chapter VII International Stabilization Force to 
support the implementation of the Agreement;193   
(4) United States support for security sector restructuring;194   
(5) establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission;195   
(6) establishment of a governance reform commission to review the 
existing program for the Promotion of Good Governance in 
Liberia;196   
(7) authorization for LURD and MODEL to transform into political 
parties;197   
(8) provision of twenty-four of the seventy-six seats of the National 
Transitional Legislative Assembly to members of LURD and 
MODEL;198   
(9) allocation of key ministries to warring parties;199 and  
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(10) consideration of recommendations for general amnesty to all 
persons and parties engaged or involved in military activities 
during the Liberian conflict.200 
 In form and structure, the CPA resembles Sierra Leone’s Lome 
Accord.  However, several aspects of the road to the CPA indicate that 
Liberia’s future might not resemble that of Sierra Leone’s.  The NTGL faces 
particular challenges due to the conflicts arising from the composition of its 
personnel and its substantive goals as outlined by the CPA.201  Though the 
agreement strives to strike a balance between the preexisting government in 
Liberia, the two major rebel factions, LURD and MODEL, and “civil 
society,” it is difficult to see how future violence will be averted given the 
division of political power and the partition of control over Liberia’s 
resources as outlined by the Agreement.   
 In general, this agreement strikes only at the manifestations of 
Liberia’s general sickness: the culture of impunity.  Because the agreement 
does not strike at the heart of the cause of insecurity and violence in Liberia—
irresponsible elite control—there is no hope that this agreement will render 
any long-lasting solution for Liberia.  More specifically, these negotiations 
are doomed to fail for at least four reasons.  First, the CPA is just one in a line 
of similar peace agreements in Liberia’s history that have failed,202 and there 
is no indication that this agreement, especially with so much control 
designated to rebels, will be any different.  Second, the mere fact of rebel 
exercise of control over key sectors and resources is an indication that this 
agreement is doomed.203  Remember Sierra Leone.204  Third, the possibility of 
a general amnesty for those who participated in the Liberian wars is the most 
serious flaw.205  On the one hand, the amnesty could be a diplomatic 
concession to rebels for the sake of maintaining a fragile peace.206  On the 
other hand, there is no way for the fragile peace to be maintained when the 
real perpetrators are allowed to exist in society without confronting their 
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wrongs in some acceptable way.  Finally, there seems to be no real 
participation of ordinary Liberians in the negotiation of the peace agreement 
under which they are to live.   
a.  Liberia’s History of Failed Peace Agreements 
 Signed on August 18, 2003 in the capital of the West African 
Republic of Ghana, the CPA comes on the heels of several peace agreements 
that have been negotiated in Liberia’s recent history.207  Between 1990 and 
1997, there were thirteen major ECOWAS, the west-African economic and 
peace keeping organization, sponsored agreements.208  With the benefit of 
hindsight, it is clear that these initiatives have repeatedly and tragically 
failed.209  The reasons for failure are many.  Some commentators have 
suggested that these agreements failed because they did not meet the needs 
and interests of Liberia’s warring factions and their leaders, much less those 
of civilian populations.210  Others have presented views suggesting that 
Nigeria’s role in the Economic Community Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) – 
the peacekeeping arm of ECOWAS – contributed to the failure of these 
agreements and prolonged the civil war because it ceased to be “an impartial 
peacekeeping force and had turned into just another combatant.”211  Finally, 
some have suggested that Taylor’s determination, with the backing of the 
strongest rebel group, to capture the capital city of Monrovia and ultimately 
the presidency could not be averted by any peace process.212  Although a 
combination of all these factors contribute to continual failure of Liberia’s 
peace process, this last view is of fundamental significance.  Again, securing 
the presidency does not only mean Taylor’s ascendancy to Head of State, but 
also seizing territory means securing commercial alliances and creating 
economic opportunities.213 
 The first set of agreements, including the Banjul peace plan and the 
Yamoussoukro agreement, were largely crafted by Liberia’s civil society 
groups.214   Their mandate was to establish a peacekeeping force, ECOMOG, 
which would supervise a cease-fire and establish an interim government.  
During this first round of negotiations, none of the faction leaders were 
allowed to join the interim government.215  The Yamoussoukro agreement 
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differed from the Banjul peace in that it attempted to balance the Nigerian 
dominance, with more francophone support through Senegal in the peace 
negotiation process.216  
 These first negotiations failed for many reasons, but primarily 
because there was absolutely no negotiation with the factions involved.217  At 
this time Taylor and his forces grew stronger, and he refused to support the 
efforts of ECOMOG at peacekeeping if he could not be at the negotiating 
table.218  Furthermore, these early accords gave too central a role to the 
Nigerian-run ECOMOG.  The factions would not agree to a peace because 
they believed that ECOMOG did not act impartially during the peace 
process.219  At this time ECOMOG did not have the support of other West 
African countries because of its Nigerian dominance nor did it have the 
support of Liberian rebel groups.   
 In stark contrast to the first round of agreements, the July 1993 
Cotonou Accord220 and all of the peace agreements since have attempted to 
move away from this ECOWAS-dominated diplomacy by ringing in the era of 
power-sharing agreements.221  ECOWAS leaders and the UN employed the 
simple reasoning that by accommodating the aspirations of the armed 
factions, peace would be achieved at a faster pace.   
 This plan, like the others, quickly unraveled because an increase in 
the number of rebel groups made it increasingly difficult to satisfy all rebel 
desires.222  Because of the sheer number of rebel groups at the negotiating 
table, it became more and more difficult to coordinate a policy for ending war 
in Liberia, especially when the rebel groups benefited economically by taking 
control over key resources in Liberia-- resources that were often in 
concentrated geographical areas that were easy to pirate.223  Seen in this 
manner, the Cotonou Accord ultimately failed because the power-sharing 
regime did not recognize that the factions had vested interests in maintaining 
instability rather than moving towards peace.224   
 Even after the failure of the Cotonou Accord, in 1994 ECOWAS still 
believed that the only way to bring peace to Liberia was to include warlords 
                                                 
 216 Id. at 54.  
 217 Alao, supra note 202.  
 218 ADEBAJO, supra note 16, at 53.   
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in the government.225  There was hope that the Abuja Accords would not 
present the same failures as the earlier accords for three reasons.  First, Abuja 
attempted to improve on Cotonou by first assuming that inclusion of the 
factions was the first step in direction towards peace and that the next logical 
step would be to assure a well-run disarmament program.226  Second, it was 
assumed that political power could be exchanged for military peace.  Since 
Taylor’s faction suddenly befriended ECOMOG, it was thought that the peace 
process would no longer be threatened.227  Finally, optimism came from 
assuming that because the faction fighters had become weary of fighting, 
evidenced through voluntary disarmament, there would now be peace.228 
 The future of the Abuja Accords looked bleak, for several reasons, 
soon after they went into effect.  Liberia’s security situation remained weak 
due to the mobilization of armed groups in support of rival warlords;229 
following ECOMOG’s departure, Liberia’s borders were weakened;230 
Taylor’s opponents viewed the state apparatus as a mere extension of his own 
personal power;231 and Taylor himself still had the mentality of a warlord.232  
The Abuja Accords were ultimately misguided because of their indulgent 
characteristics.  A major flaw has been the increasing willingness to cede 
power to the factions in the executive arm of the transitional government 
without demanding accountability for continual breaches of the agreements 
themselves.  These same flaws are obvious in Liberia’s latest attempt at 
peace. 
b.  Members of the NTGL:  Rebels Turned Politicians 
The allocation of seats in the NTGL shows that peace negotiators 
have capitulated to the rebels in a more frightening manner than in Sierra 
Leone.233  The outgoing government, designated in the CPA as one of the 
three warring parties, currently has five of its ministers in key government 
                                                 
 225 Id. at 60. 
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227 Id. at 61.  
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231 Id. at 70. 
232 Id. at 71. 
233 One might argue that Charles Taylor initiated this pattern of negotiation with 
warlords.  Even after the first civil war when the international community was in 
negotiations with Charles Taylor over the Abuja agreement, Taylor contended that 
only the inclusion of warlords who held effective control of the country would 
guarantee that any interim regime might be able to exercise leadership.  See PHAM, 
supra note 1, at 126.  Pham argues that the acceptance of this rationale stood in stark 
contrast to a previous policy of bolstering the civilian political leaders.  Id. 
380 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF LEGAL INFORMATION [Vol. 33:3 
 
positions, while the two most notorious rebel groups combined hold seven 
key positions in the transitional government:  agriculture; commerce and 
industry; finance; foreign affairs; justice; labor; and land, mines and energy.234  
Other political parties and civil society organizations hold six seats.235  Yet 
the main concern of former government members of the NTGL and members 
of LURD and MODEL seems to be securing jobs for themselves during the 
2005 elections instead of forging a sustainable economic, political, and social 
future of Liberia.236  The Special Representative of the UN Secretary General 
(SRSG) in Liberia, Jacques Paul Klein, has reported that Chairman Bryant 
often acts at the whims of the rebel politicians, making it difficult for him to 
address human rights abuses and institutional reform.237   
 The provision of seats to rebel leaders seems to be a complete 
windfall for human rights violators.  Law professor Ikechi Mgbeoji 
condemned the transformation of violent rebel groups into political parties 
when the first Liberian civil war ended.238  First, he argued, the global 
community too easily accepts the idea that mere elections are the cornerstone 
to stability.239  Second, Mgbeoji argues that the metamorphosis of violent 
rebel groups into political parties at the insistence of the international 
community promotes the culture of coercion and corruption.240  More 
specifically, this amounts to society’s acceptance of noncompliance with the 
law, glorification of the use of arms to gain power, and failure to hold rebels 
and government leaders accountable for their criminal conduct and human 
rights violations against the masses.   
 Additionally, and possibly more harmfully, this attention to the 
desires of rebel groups serves as a decoy that diverts attention from the root 
cause of insecurity in the first place — bad leadership.  When the 
international community continues to focus on rebels and factions, they miss 
the opportunity to meaningfully alter post-colonial African leadership.   
c. General Amnesty: A Curse Unto Itself 
 The possibility of general amnesty241 is one of the most serious flaws 
of the CPA.  Besides the fact that granting a general amnesty is one way of 
encouraging rebels to participate in the peace process, there are several 
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theoretical and practical problems with this form of concession. 242  The 
possibility of a general amnesty in the Liberian context is problematic legally, 
politically, and morally.  First, the state of the legality of amnesty in the 
Liberian context is unclear under international law.243  Given that the 
determination of whether to grant amnesty involves an extremely context-
sensitive legal decision making-process, there has been no real determination 
by policy makers in Liberia that a blanket amnesty was the most appropriate 
option for this context.   
 Although it is not definitive that international law prohibits general 
amnesty for crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes 
and other serious violations of international law, it is clear that the UN has 
consistently maintained the position that amnesty cannot be granted for such 
acts.244  Additionally, Human Rights Watch has spoken out against this type 
of provision, and states that impunity for crimes under international law must 
end and that there can be no amnesty for such crimes.245  Second, amnesty 
alone is a dangerous formula for peace because of the messages it sends to 
elites, to rebels and to society that crimes can be committed and civil wars 
staged with no consequences for any of the parties involved.  Finally, the 
blind granting of amnesty does not consider the moral hazards of dismissing 
the role of punishment of the main perpetrators.  A lesson should have been 
learned from the Sierra Leone case.  There the UN ultimately rejected the idea 
that a blanket amnesty could be granted for violations of international law 
including war crimes and crimes against humanity.246   
d.  Participation of Ordinary Liberians 
 While commentators on the CPA highlight the complex nature of the 
new role that the agreement affords for Liberian civil society organizations, 
there is no indication that the voices of ordinary Liberians were present in the 
                                                 
242 Karen Gallagher, No Justice, No Peace: The Legalities and Realities of 
Amnesty in Sierra Leone, 23 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 149 (2000); Human Rights Watch, 
The Sierra Leone Amnesty under International Law (1999),  at 
http://www.hrw.org/campaings/sierra/int-law2.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2005) 
243 In some cases the granting of amnesty conforms to international law while in 
other cases a granting of amnesty would be a clear violation of international law.  See 
Gallagher, supra note 242, at 166-174.  It is not absolute whether states have a duty to 
prosecute certain violations.  Id.  In international law, the answer lies in a case by case 
determination.  Id.  
244 Secretary General Report S/2000/915, supra note 11, at 5.  
245 Human Rights Watch, The Sierra Leone Amnesty under International Law, 
supra note 242.  
246 MURPHY, supra note 176, at 380.  
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negotiation of the peace agreement or in its current interpretation.247  Instead, 
the CPA seems to have been born from the negotiations between ECOWAS, 
the President of Ghana, and a Nigerian mediator.248  Observers of the peace 
process have encouraged what remains of Liberian civil society to improve 
citizens’ understanding of the Accra Agreement as a means of engaging the 
participation of all Liberians in the transition process.249  Similarly, the 
International Center for Transitional Justice has argued that “a rule of law 
strategy must be rooted in local conditions, and developed with local civil 
society.”250  Furthermore, outreach should move beyond the capital so that 
members of the larger Liberian community can begin to have faith in the new 
systems put in place.251  There is no indication, however, that organizations 
have attempted to move beyond Monrovia to teach Liberians about the peace 
agreement.   
 Even the participation of Liberia’s civil society has been criticized.  
On the one hand, civil society’s new place in both the legislature and the 
executive branches takes civil society beyond their traditional roles as 
advocates, educators and watchdogs.252  In this way, Liberian civic leaders 
can promote democracy in government from within.  On the other hand, those 
civil society organizations that wish to maintain their independence and 
traditional watchdog role are weary of an insider civil society that will be 
confronted by the realities and temptations of political life.253 
e.  Predicting Failure:  Sierra Leone Has It Right 
 Several factors indicate that a negotiated peace with no mechanism 
for accountability will fail and that Liberia too should be urged to pursue a 
Special Court like the one created in Sierra Leone.  I address this in detail in 
Part III.  First, now that the peace process is well under way, there have been 
accusations that the transitional government has let down the Liberian people 
                                                 
247 NDI, Civil Society’s Role, supra note 188, at 5-6.  This summary highlights 
the tension that the Accra Agreement represents where civil society has a new role as 
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traditional role as watchdogs of the politicians because now civic members are 
political insiders.  Id. Although civil society can take on many meanings, traditionally 
civil society is non-political, non-governmental, broad based and representative of the 
masses.  Id. at 11.  
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through its inability to ensure their security.254  Continuous reports detail lack 
of every-day control over ex-combatants and Liberian citizens in general.255  
Even with a negotiated settlement, ex-combatants have expressed 
unwillingness to disarm without the promise of jobs.256  Therefore, the 
reintegration portion of the Disarmament, Reintegration, and Rehabilitation 
Program is increasingly a worry given the country’s 85% unemployment 
rate.257  In Sierra Leone, the disarmament process, with the help of the British, 
took place at a much faster pace.258  These incidents highlight that negotiated 
settlements do not always secure peace for a fragile, failed state.  This occurs 
because the agreements are not addressing the root issues.   
 Some will observe that the CPA will establish a TRCto provide a 
forum to address issues of impunity, as well as an opportunity for victims and 
perpetrators of human rights violations to share their experiences; however, 
this will not extend far enough to develop a clear picture of the past and to 
facilitate genuine healing and reconciliation.  
III.   
THE JUSTICE APPROACH TO ENDING THE CULTURE OF IMPUNITY 
 The negotiators of peace in Liberia chose to privilege diplomacy over 
justice in their attempt to move Liberia out of its civil war period and into a 
period of stability.  In making this choice, they have also rejected the use of 
justice to achieve stability.  This choice partly stems from fear that 
punishment will only lead to more violence and instability.259  The arguments 
against using the least punitive mechanisms possible (like negotiated peace 
                                                 
254 Abdullah Dukuly, Development-Liberia:  Rise In Crime Ignites Mob Justice, 1 
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http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=618656161&sid=1&Fmt=3&clientId=1566&R
QT=309&VName=PQD. (last visited Apr. 12, 2005).  
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agreements similar to Liberia’s) to address war-torn societies are abundant 
and forceful; however, these interventions do not fully consider Liberia's 
historical situation.  By targeting the masses or the rebel groups as the site of 
intervention during transitional periods, one misses the point that the elites 
need the intervention, not the masses.  Addressing the needs of victims and 
focusing too heavily on disarming members of factions ignores the bigger 
problem, one that Sierra Leone has recognized.260   
 In this regard, a Special Court for Liberia would be the best option for 
Liberia for at least three reasons.  First, Sierra Leone’s approach to 
transitional justice, with its creation of a SCSL, attests to the importance of 
using justice to assure accountability.  In the years following Sierra Leone’s 
civil war and the establishment of the mixed tribunal, there are signs that the 
society is beginning to institutionalize the culture of human rights, and the 
political scene has moved away from impunity.261  Second, there is modest 
empirical evidence that prosecution of elite actors can play a role in changing 
the calculation of political actors in transitional states such as Liberia.  This 
could have a tremendous effect on future politics in Liberia.262  Third, a 
hybrid court for Liberia would allow it to rebuild its own justice system and to 
address crimes that were specifically Liberian in nature, thus moving the 
country forward.  Finally, given the fact that there have been prosecutions of 
war criminals in similar situations in other countries, there seems to be a 
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Punishments other than imprisonment are a very viable option for actors like Charles 
Taylor.   
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moral call for justice in the Liberian context as well.263  Furthermore, the 
United States holds a unique relationship with Liberia that will allow it to 
facilitate this process.264   
 I first address the example of Sierra Leone and the promise that it 
represents for the possibility of a court in Liberia.  Next, I briefly survey the 
challenges to the establishment of a Special Court for Liberia.  These 
challenges relate to the model that should be used during transition periods to 
ensure peace and stability and the practical challenges to implementation and 
securing legitimacy.  These critiques generally insist that the criminal law 
model as the primary manner to promote rule of law compliance is not useful.  
First, these critiques insist that to achieve peace and reconciliation in society, 
political carrots such as amnesty, truth and reconciliation commissions or 
traditional forms of dispute resolution should be used.  Second, when it is 
suggested that more punitive mechanisms such as tribunals should be used, 
the response is often raised that there is no way to insure legitimacy through 
externally influenced trials and that the costs of punitive mechanisms such as 
trials are prohibitively expensive. 
 Instead of challenging the efficacy of less punitive mechanisms of 
transitional justice, I suggest that a Special Court for Liberia would create a 
hands-on approach to building the respect for a tradition of rule of law and 
justice in a country that purports to have such a tradition, but in reality it 
completely lacks such a tradition.  The ultimate goal of a Special Court for 
Liberia would be to address the burgeoning culture of impunity that continues 
to damage the prospects for peace in Liberia.265  By focusing on the 
                                                 
263 Susan Tiefenbrun, Peace with Justice, 3 HOFSTRA L. & POL’Y SYMP. 1 (1999) 
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perpetrators of the civil wars—those who planned and implemented the civil 
wars—a society can begin to increase the cost of this type of political culture, 
thus changing the long-term behavior of politicians.  Implementing the 
Special Court for Liberia, the CPA would need to be revised.  This type of 
structure would need to be conditioned upon the rejection of a blanket 
amnesty for war crimes and crimes against humanity as was done in Sierra 
Leone, requiring an amendment or modification of the CPA.  
A.  The Special Court for Sierra Leone:  The New Path Forward 
 Upon the failure of the Lome Accord at the hands of persistent rebels 
and the desire to go further than the mandate of the TRC, the people of Sierra 
Leone, the Sierra Leonean government, and the UN combined efforts to create 
and to implement the SCSL.266  Though the primary players in the creation of 
the Special Court have been the government of Sierra Leone, the United 
States and the UN, the Special Court has been assisted by local civil society 
organizations that contribute to the court’s outreach function.267  Some 
suggest that this strong support among both the Sierra Leonean people and in 
the UN for the court’s establishment has been one of the main reasons for its 
perceived success amongst Sierra Leoneans.268   
 The SCSL is a unique mechanism for war crimes law enforcement.269  
The SCSL was created as an agreement between the UN and Sierra Leone, 
with the specific mandate to bring to justice those “who bear the greatest 
responsibility” for serious violations of international humanitarian law and 
                                                                                                                    
that the tribunals meet the criteria of independence and impartiality and that they get 
support from the international community as a whole.  Id. at 304.  
266 For discussions on potential evidentiary and other legal issues that are 
beginning to present themselves to both the TRC and the SCSL see generally Daniel 
J. Macaluso, Absolute and Free Pardon: The Effect of the Amnesty Provision in the 
Lome Peace Agreement on the Jurisdiction of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 27 
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 347 (2001); Hall & Kazemi, supra note 170, at 287; Elizabeth M. 
Evenson, Truth and Justice in Sierra Leone: Coordination Between Commission and 
Court, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 730 (2004); and MARIEKE WIERDA ET AL., EXPLORING 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SPECIAL COURT AND THE TRUTH AND 
RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SIERRA LEONE, The International Center for 
Transitional Justice (2002) available at 
http://www.ictj.org/downloads/TRCSpecialCourt.pdf.   
267 ICTJ, Statement, supra note 182.  
268 U.N. Doc. S/2000/1055 
269 Micaela Frulli, The Special Court for Sierra Leone:  Some Preliminary 
Comments, 11 EUR. J INT’L L 833 (2000).  The SCSL is the first ad hoc criminal 
tribunal based upon an agreement between the UN and the government of a member 
state.  The judges are to be appointed partly by the Government of Sierra Leone and 
party by the UN.  Further, the Court’s jurisdiction embraces both international crimes 
and crimes of national character.   
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Sierra Leonean law, committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since 
November 30, 1996.270  The Court’s main focus is to try those who held 
leadership and command positions, that is, those who planned and instigated 
attacks.271  The government and civil society of Sierra Leone have concluded 
that lower level perpetrators of human rights violations and victims of these 
violations will have their opportunity for justice through Sierra Leone’s Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission.272   
 The SCSL has indicted thirteen people for war crimes, including 
former Liberian president Charles Taylor273 and former Sierra Leone 
government minister Hinga Norman.274  The surviving indictees are being 
charged with war crimes, crimes against humanity, and serious violations of 
international humanitarian law.275   
 The Special Court is more flexible than a fully international court 
because the Court can apply both international law as well as Sierra Leonean 
law,276 allowing the Court to address crimes specific to the Sierra Leonean 
conflict.  Yet the reach of the Special Court is limited to the national courts of 
Sierra Leone and does not extend to the courts of third states.277  Unlike Sierra 
Leone, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) Tribunals were 
mandatory in nature because the UN determined under Chapter VII of the UN 
charter that the wars in those countries were a threat to international peace and 
security.278   
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 The Court has issued a number of precedent-setting decisions on 
international law, including a ruling in 2004 that heads of state are not 
immune from prosecution before an international court.279  Crimes under 
Sierra Leonean law are limited to offences relating to the abuse of girls and 
damage to property under two Sierra Leonean statutes.280  This ability of the 
Court to decide cases under Sierra Leonean law reinforces Sierra Leone’s 
rules of law alongside the international rules that will be applied.   
 Some would argue that the most pressing issue facing the court relates 
to its financing mechanism.  The government of Sierra Leone is unable to 
contribute in any significant manner to the operational costs of the Special 
Court, which means that the Court relies primarily on contributions from non-
governmental sources.281  Institutions created by the Security Council, such as 
the ICTR and the ICTY, are funded by scaled assessments, in which each 
country's contribution is proportionate to its size and wealth.282   However, 
because the UN did not directly establish by the SCSL, the Sierra Leone court 
is financed through voluntary contributions.  One should note, however, that a 
major obstacle for funding the Court is its relative inability to collect the 
funds that donor states have pledged.283   
 Yet it is highly unlikely that the international community will let this 
effort fail.284  By the end of 2003, the United States, through its United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID) program, provided the 
Special Court a total of $15 million to pursue its operations.285  The 
organization’s rationale for support of the Court is that the nation’s fragile 
peace will depend heavily on sustained external support.  Furthermore, given 
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the United Kingdom’s unique connection to Sierra Leone,286 British aid for 
Sierra Leone is more than likely. 
 The critiques of the SCSL have been offset by its promises.  The hope 
is that trials taking place in Freetown will send a powerful message to the 
people of Sierra Leone that justice is being done within the framework of the 
rule of law.  There are signs that these goals are being achieved.  The special 
court has trained local attorneys and sent teams to explain legal concepts to 
villagers, soldiers, and students.287  Additionally, the simple fact that the 
SCSL has indicted Charles Taylor sends the message that Sierra Leone is 
committed to changing its legal landscape.   
B. Dominant Methods of Addressing the Aftermath of Violence, Just 
as Many Unanswered Questions and Possibly the Wrong Target:  Amnesty, 
Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, and Traditional Mechanisms for 
Peace and Reconciliation in Liberia 
 The problem of how many and who to punish, and an ethic of 
reconciliation and forgiveness, permeate discourse on international peace and 
justice.288  Professors Laurel Fletcher and Martha Minow have considered the 
question of why countries address past episodes of mass violence, and the 
goals they seek to achieve.289  These goals include:   
(1) discovering and publicizing the truth;  
(2) making a symbolic break with the past;  
(3) promoting the rule of law and strengthening democratic 
institutions;  
(4) deterrence;  
(5) punishment of perpetrators; and  
(6) healing victims and achieving social reconstruction.290   
As part of the discussion on which of these goals should be privileged over 
others, there is a growing debate as to whether trials are useful in the 
reconciliation process at all.291   
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 Although I discuss both the utility and the problems with trials in the 
next section, I assert first that in arguing for less punitive measures, some 
scholars and policymakers question the effectiveness of law in promoting 
peace in these ruined societies.  First, some suggest that although trials have 
the potential to be effective and efficient, there is no hard proof that they 
actually promote rule of law goals or peace.292  At worst, trials may detract 
from rule of law goals because they lead to further instability in the 
country.293  This is so because trials focus on punishing instead of bringing 
about economic justice and political change.  Second, some suggest that trials 
as an exclusive means to promoting peace and justice do not deal adequately 
with the need for all members of a society to be reconciled.294  Finally, trials 
and other reconstruction efforts are too expensive considering the amount of 
infrastructure and training needed to get them running.295 
 In response to claims about the disadvantages of trials, transitional 
justice scholars focus primarily on three types of less punitive mechanisms.296  
                                                                                                                    
CENTER FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (ICTJ), The “Legacy” of the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone 11 (2003)(citing potential threats to the Court’s legacy including lack of 
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society undergoing transition); Danilo Zolo, Peace Through Criminal Law?, 2 J. 
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international criminal justice remains quite uncertain and confused when compared to 
domestic law); Sarah Williams, The Cambodian Extraordinary Chambers—A 
Dangerous Precedent for International Justice?, 53 ICLQ 227, 244 (2004) (noting 
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standards of procedural fairness and judicial independence and impartiality).  
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L. J. 729, 738 (2003) (arguing that regional courts could reduce the financial burden 
of international criminal law enforcement).  
296 See, e.g., Jeremy Sarkin & Erin Daly, Too Many Questions, Too Few 
Answers: Reconciliation in Transitional Societies, 35 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L REV. 661, 
719 (2004) (noting that while policy makers promote reconciliation programs they do 
not pay attention to the serious questions that reconciliation programs raise); Erin 
Daly, Between Punitive and Reconstructive Justice: The Gacaca Courts in Rwanda, 
34 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 355, 356 (2002) (noting some serious deprivations of 
due process rights in the gacaca system and recommending amnesty to assist in 
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Scholars have offered alternatives such as amnesty in exchange for truth and 
reconciliation, or using traditional courts and other traditional dispute 
mechanisms to dispense more quickly with less serious violations.  The use of 
these mechanisms suggests that, to move from a society of violence and to 
rehabilitate the masses, the society and the international community must 
promote mechanisms that target society at large instead of individual 
perpetrators. 297 
1.  The Amnesty as a Transitional Mechanism:  Too Many Unanswered 
Questions 
 Currently, the CPA calls for the consideration of amnesty for crimes 
committed during the civil war in Liberia.298  Amnesty is the decision by 
which a society decides not to prosecute the wrongs of a predecessor regime 
or insurgents during the regime.299  As an alternative to punishment, amnesty 
attempts to assure that transitions will happen peacefully.300  Professors 
Jeremy Sarkin and Erin Daly cite three reasons why a transitional government 
might sanction an amnesty.301  First, nascent governments may make the 
political calculation to grant amnesty to gain the support or acquiescence of 
outgoing officials.302  Second, amnesty may result from a calculated 
conclusion that doing nothing is better than doing anything.303  Finally, a new 
government might be unable to pursue other methods of reconciliation for 
lack of political or economic resources thus causing a de facto amnesty.304  
 The dominant critique of a general amnesty, as opposed to a limited 
amnesty, however, is that it capitulates to past perpetrators and does not 
honestly attempt to move a country forward.305  The danger of amnesty, from 
this perspective, is that it can easily cause a society to slip into a culture of 
impunity.306  Sarkin and Daly argue that this may occur if “amnesty confirms 
a lack of accountability and of responsibility—if it denies the wrongfulness of 
                                                                                                                    
reconstruction); Fletcher & Weinstein, supra note 288, at 573-639 (recommending an 
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the prior regime’s actions and, ultimately denies the fact of those actions.”307  
Undoubtedly, supporters of amnesty will point how, in South Africa, the TRC 
used the promise of amnesty to obtain some information about past crimes; it 
is generally believed that the TRC achieved more truth than would have been 
possible otherwise.308  I do not challenge this notion here.  Yet in South 
Africa, the political and social environment was more conducive for amnesty 
than in countries such as Sierra Leone and Liberia.   
 I suggest that a second fatal problem with the granting of a general 
amnesty is that no consensus exists on when amnesty should be granted and 
when it should not.309  There are reasons why amnesties work in contexts such 
as South Africa, but might not be as helpful in countries with a history like 
Liberia.  Even those who argue that amnesty could be a positive mechanism 
to achieve societal reconciliation are firm in the suggestion that there are two 
requirements that must temper the granting of amnesty.310  First, amnesty 
should always be individual and not general.311  Each applicant should submit 
voluntarily to the terms of the amnesty and a blanket amnesty should be 
disfavored.  Second, Sarkin and Daly argue that amnesties should be 
conditional.312  In other words, there is consensus that amnesty should not be 
given away for free or in exchange for a pre-existing duty such as a duty to 
obey the law.  The CPA in its current form does not suggest a limitation on 
the application of amnesty.313  For this reason, this provision of the agreement 
should not be followed. 
2.  Truth and Reconciliation Commissions:  The Wrong Target 
 The CPA also calls for the establishment of a truth and reconciliation 
commission.314  Truth commissions are institutions established to review an 
era of systematic violence and to provide an authoritative account of what 
happened.315  Amnesty International has indicated that such a commission 
may have an important role in establishing the facts and identifying those 
responsible for crimes under international law.  Nevertheless, it cannot be a 
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substitute for a court of law to try alleged perpetrators of serious violations of 
international law.316   
 In popular culture, the South African TRC is the point of reference for 
those who espouse reconciliation and security through forgiveness as the 
dominant form of transitional justice.317  The South African TRC used the 
promise of amnesty to obtain information about past crimes to produce a 
fuller understanding of the truth of what occurred during the Apartheid Era.318  
South Africa was dealing largely with the problem of societal racism in the 
form of Apartheid.  Apartheid as a system of racism permeated all aspects of 
society and effected race relations among all South Africans.319  The entire 
country needed the healing effects of the TRC.  Liberia is different; not all of 
Liberia’s people act in a way to destroy the purpose of the state of Liberia.  
But the elites in Liberia do.    Martha Minow suggests that truth commissions 
might address mass violence in societies better than trials because, designed 
to be a sympathetic forum for survivors wishing to testify, they are a more 
therapeutically appropriate model for victims. 320 
 TRCs may actually help victims coping with past violence inflicted 
on their communities.  But, aren’t the victims really the wrong target for 
sustained intervention?  The needs of victims will be positively addressed if 
the root causes of civil strife are dealt with through a long-term strategy that 
addresses impunity in African states and state-sponsored or state-supported 
violence against the masses.  It simply is not clear how a truth commission 
can promote reconciliation in society when the major perpetrators of violence 
in Liberia are at large or hold seats in the transitional government.  Scholars 
who focus on TRC effectiveness have left this tension unexplained.  
Governance in Liberia is unlikely to change when there is no advantage to do 
so, that is, when political elites are allowed to escape through the transition 
cracks because all of the transition resources are focused on victims.   
 Additionally, several transitional scholars, including Professors 
Sarkin and Daly, note that no quantitative study exists to assesses the success 
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of truth commissions.321  Because further empirical study is needed to test 
arguments for truth commissions, arguments for alternative models of 
transition as well as for trials are weakened.  In Sierra Leone, one of the 
problems that arose over the possibility of a TRCwas that some individuals 
were reluctant to testify to a commission for fear that they would implicate 
their friends.322  Furthermore, some civil society organizations have noted that 
Liberia has not even begun the process of implementing a well run TRClike 
the TRC in Sierra Leone.323  Liberia has failed to hold conferences involving 
the participation of members of Liberian society in order to ascertain their 
ideas about the need for a commission; this might be because Liberian civil 
society, though present, is really weak.  Instead, the transitional government 
of Liberia continues to focus exclusively on the needs of rebels-turned-
politicians, despite the fact that many Liberians have expressed the view that 
they want Charles Taylor to be brought to justice in some forum.324   
3.  Traditional Mechanisms of Dispute Resolution:  What is Traditional? 
 Finally, scholars critiquing the state-centered rule of law model 
promote more grassroots approaches to addressing communal violence.325  
These approaches tend to promote revitalizing traditional forms of dispute 
resolution.326  Some have called this form of reconciliation “restorative 
justice”-- a form of justice more characteristic of traditional African 
jurisprudence.327  With this type of justice, the goal is not retribution or 
punishment, but “redressing of imbalances, the restoration of broken 
relationships, [and] a seeking to rehabilitate the victim and the perpetrator . . 
..”328   
 Professor Jennifer Widner explores the role of local forums in post-
conflict transitions.329  She explains that traditional forums for dispute 
resolution that stress mediation and arbitration serve as a gap filler for the 
formal judicial system while lawyers are trained and courthouses are 
rebuilt.330  Widner’s main argument for greater reliance on traditional courts is 
that the state judiciary can become overburdened if too many cases are 
referred to them during vulnerable times.331  Customary and community 
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courts, Widner argues, can establish a foundation for rule of law 
reconstruction because they have been effective in resolving ordinary disputes 
fairly and quickly.332   
 In Rwanda, for example, the gacaca, or village courts, have enjoyed a 
resurgence since the end of the genocide.333  The Rwandan government 
decided to use the gacaca courts to deal with lower-level offenders at a 
community level as a result of the country’s realization that the Rwandan 
justice system could not handle the huge number of genocide cases.334  Those 
who promote the gacaca system argue that it will have healing effects for 
society because it will provide individuals the chance to discuss the genocide, 
participate in the creation of justice and a standard of responsibility for 
criminal actions, and deal with traumatic events more quickly.335   
 Still, observers also have several reservations about the gacaca system 
that highlight more general concerns about relying on tradition and native 
customs in forging modern legal practice.336  First, gacaca was traditionally a 
dispute settlement mechanism for resolving local disputes over family 
matters, property rights, and other local concerns and may not adapt as a 
criminal justice model.337  Second, no system protects witnesses and victims, 
monitors the release of defendants, or ensures that they do not retaliate against 
their accusers.338  Finally, gacaca may not protect the due process rights of the 
accused.339  More recently, scholars argue that the gacaca process might 
actually contribute to the insecurity of all Rwandan citizens in the future, 
emphasizing the fact that these courts will accentuate ethnic divides in 
Rwandan society because they only try genocide crimes and not war 
crimes.340  Hutus will be disproportionately charged with crimes.  These 
concerns with gacaca only highlight larger concerns about privileging 
traditional practices over more modern ones.  While traditional practices 
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ought not to be rejected outright, we must avoid supporting practices simply 
because they have historical or traditional roots.341   
 Turning to Liberia, there has been no suggestion that the Liberian 
government would be willing to turn over matters of transitional justice to 
Liberian traditional courts, even though indigenous Liberians do have 
informal dispute settlement mechanisms.342  Additionally, the same problems 
that face the gacaca courts in Rwanda would probably face any traditional 
court in Liberia.  Furthermore, the cultural context in Liberia is different from 
that of Rwanda; Liberia has over sixteen ethnic groups and it is not clear that 
the people of Liberia would agree upon the type of dispute mechanism that 
should be used.  Furthermore, there were many instances of cross-ethnic 
violence in Liberia, and forcing members of outside ethnic groups to appear 
before other ethnic courts might undermine perceptions of fairness.   
C. In Defense of Trials:  Why Punish? 
 A growing body of evidence indicates that punitive measures such as 
trials, though imperfect, can contribute greatly to addressing the problems 
articulated in the previous section.  I have chosen to discuss the particular 
contribution that trials offer the Liberian context because of the pressing need 
to end the culture of impunity.  This is especially true in a country that could 
be an example for other African states struggling with similar issues of 
accountability.  Simply stated, if the manner in which power is exercised in 
societies can be changed by deterring those who wield the most power in 
society, the ethic of accountability can begin to permeate the greater political 
culture.   
1.  The Modern Critique of the Use of Trials during Transitional Periods 
 Traditionally, advocates of trials believe that they will help 
communities rebuild because they support one or more of the following goals:   
(1) to discover and publicize the truth of past atrocities;  
(2) to punish perpetrators;  
(3) to respond to the needs of victims;  
(4) to promote the rule of law in emerging democracies; and  
(5) to promote reconciliation.343   
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These goals are very similar to those in societies who chose to address past 
violence in the first place.   
 
 In periods of transition, Professor Ruti Teitel explains, law’s role has 
been to “express the justice of the successor regime.”344  In Teitel’s view, 
“trials offer a transitional mechanism for normative transformation to express 
public condemnation of aspects of the past, as well as public legitimation of 
the new rule of law.345  Trials, in this sense, focus on the individuals 
responsible for wrongdoing.  This focus on the individual allows an express 
disavowal of the predecessor norms.   
 Still, the limits of criminal trials in promoting the goal of 
reconciliation are no secret.  There has been no lack of healthy criticism about 
the utility of trials.346  Critical scholars suggest that trials are not always the 
most productive mechanism for insuring the rule of law and peace in 
transitional societies.  Fletcher and Weinstein critique the criminal law model 
as an exclusive avenue during transitions because they believe that the 
emphasis on criminal trials overshadows other means of achieving the goal of 
anti-impunity for human rights violators.347  Others suggest that pursing 
perpetrators will only result in more violence because the security structures 
in weak states are not strong enough to support tribunals;348 or that victims 
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and bystanders are left without a means to heal because all resources have 
been spent on the court, in turn creating a desire for vengeance.349   
 Although a trial of perpetrators might address goals two through five 
above, some scholars do not see how trials can contribute to truth telling or to 
healing victims.350  These scholars have constructed a critical discourse on 
trials that focuses primarily on trials' inability to address the needs of victims.  
For example, Fletcher and Weinstein argue that the current paradigm punishes 
only a few select individuals who carried out the most egregious acts or who 
commanded others to do so, and fails to address communal engagement with 
mass violence.351   
 The driving force behind such criticism is the perceived lack of proof 
that justice rendered in trials in Special Courts contributes to social 
reconstruction in the aftermath of mass violence.352  The particular concern is 
that “the theoretical foundation for international criminal trials borrows 
heavily from writing developed in a political and legal context in which such 
proceedings were mere aspirations and with no empirical data to substantiate 
the purported benefits of international trials.”353  Specifically, Fletcher and 
Weinstein note the dearth of studies of the effects of criminal trials on 
victims, bystanders, and perpetrators and whether these trials can affect 
societal beliefs and attitudes.354  Similarly, there is little evidence that the 
recipients of this transitional justice connect the trials with the establishment 
of the rule of law.   
2.  Evidence that Trials Might Have a Positive Effect on Political and Social 
Change 
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 Earlier, this article suggested that there are fundamental problems 
with addressing the grievances of victims and rebels exclusively when a 
society emerges from a violent period.  These groups are often the wrong 
target.  A negotiated peace agreement such as the CPA places too much 
emphasis on power sharing with rebel politicians and not enough emphasis on 
combating the culture of impunity that leads to the need for these peace 
agreements in the first place.  Similarly, the critics of trials place too much 
emphasis on the inability of trials to address the grievances of victims.355  But 
critics of trials fail to acknowledge newer evidence showing that trials 
targeted at specific individuals tend to affect the behavior of politicians and 
have modest effects on rule of law goals.356   
 The suggestion that going after perpetrators will only lead to more 
violence might be incorrect.357  There is no solid proof that indictments of 
high level officials will necessarily lead to more societal unrest.  First, the 
object of special and international tribunals is to target a handful of 
perpetrators, not the combatants on the ground.358  It is unlikely that the 
security of Liberians will be threatened by punishing figures like Charles 
Taylor.  Security is an issue when every person that fought is rounded up and 
thrown into jail.  This is not what I am suggesting should happen.  For 
example, Hinga Norman, a rebel leader during Sierra Leone’s war, was 
indicted by the Special Court of Sierra Leone even though he received a 
cabinet post when Sierra Leone’s elected government was restored.359  Yet his 
indictment did not cause serious breaches of the Lome Accord by Sierra 
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Leoneans.  The concerns expressed about the fragility of peace is sometimes 
so overemphasized that the peace negotiation process gives factions too much 
leverage over the post-war reconstruction goals.  It might be the case that a 
strong international presence to counter rebels could actually sustain peace.   
 It is no longer an unproven statement that bringing war criminals to 
justice can send an important message that power does not buy immunity 
from charges for war crimes.360  The international community is only now 
beginning to determine the affects of the ad hoc tribunals on violence 
prevention, and the effects of the Sierra Leone court may not be known for 
years to come.  But, now that several years have passed since the instigation 
of the Rwanda and the Yugoslavia tribunals, there is some empirical evidence 
available that prosecution can actually prevent future atrocities through a 
process that marginalizes leaders who resort to ethnic appeals.361  In the 
Rwanda and the Yugoslavia contexts, at least, this marginalization has led to 
the emergence of a more moderate political rhetoric.362   
 The work of scholars such as Payam Akhavan demonstrates with 
empirical evidence that trials may prevent future atrocities by instilling 
unconscious inhibitions against violence on society at large, and cautioning 
politicians to perform a cost-benefit calculation before encouraging 
internationally illegal activities.363  Akhavan argues that individual 
accountability for massive crimes is “an essential part of a preventive strategy 
and, thus, a realistic foundation for a lasting peace.”364 
 Akhavan proceeds with the assumption that in liberal societies, the 
criminal law model presupposes some moral choice on the part of the 
perpetrators of criminal acts.365  Yet during times of mass violence, moral 
values get so inverted that individuals who are directly responsible for war 
crimes are elevated in society to a status akin to national heroes.366  Therefore, 
when individuals are encircled in collective hysteria and routine violence, 
Akhavan posits that these individuals are not likely to be deterred from 
committing crimes.367   
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 Faced with how to prevent these abnormal conditions before they 
occur or reoccur, Akhavan provides two arguments for targeting the most 
powerful leaders for punishment.368  First, “where leaders engage in some 
form of rational cost-benefit calculation, the threat of punishment can increase 
the costs of a policy that is criminal under international law.”369  The 
assumption here is that leaders would prefer long-term political viability over 
momentary glory.  Furthermore, Akhavan suggests that international 
legitimacy is a valuable asset for aspiring statesmen; the stigmatization of 
indictment may threaten the attainment of long-term political power.370  
Therefore, the threat of punishment may persuade specific leaders and 
potential perpetrators to adjust their behavior, thus removing “impediments to 
stability from the political stage, and provid[ing] an incentive for constructive 
political behavior.”371 
 Second, Akhavan’s hope is that punishment for international crimes 
will instill “unconscious inhibitions against crime” or “a condition of habitual 
lawfulness” in society.372  Through punishment of leaders, there might be a 
“progressive entrenchment of a more lawful self-conception” among the 
wider public.373  Through the force of “moral propaganda” from the 
implementation of international criminal justice, the international community 
can change the rules for the exercise of power.374   
 Two examples of how this process might work come from 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda.  In Yugoslavia, Akhavan describes how the policy 
of discrediting wartime leaders and the leadership of the Bosnian Serb 
Republic (the leadership before and during the Bosnian War) by the ICTY 
have allowed new leaders to emerge and to make politically moderate 
statements that would have ruined their political future in an earlier context.375  
Specifically, politicians in post-war Yugoslavia seem to be distancing 
themselves from the strong rhetoric of the Serb Democratic Party to claim a 
new and more moderate image.376  Part of this strategy is to clean up the 
party’s image by separating it from Radovan Karadzic, its founder and one of 
the leaders indicted by the ICTY; since the creation of the tribunal, Karadzic 
has become a liability to the party.377  Akhavan argues that the international 
community’s policy of using the ICTY as a mechanism to dispose of indicted 
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leaders has contributed to post-conflict peace building by “creating incentives 
for political parties to behave in a more conciliatory manner.”378   
 Similarly, Akhavan has evidence that the ICTR has made a modest 
contribution to post-conflict peace building by discrediting and incapacitating 
the remnants of the former genocidaire government in Rwanda.379  As in 
Yugoslavia, the ICTR, alongside the national criminal justice system in 
Rwanda, seems to have exercised a moderating influence in the post-conflict 
peace-building process in Rwanda.380  The new Tutsi government in Rwanda 
has been discouraged from sanctioning Tutsi revenge killings against Hutu, 
since the interest of the Tutsi government is served by distinguishing itself 
from the previous Hutu rulers of Rwanda.381  Furthermore, without the ICTR 
it would have been easier for the Interahamwe (Hutu forces that carried out 
the genocide) to gain support and to launch a campaign against the successor 
government.382  Instead, Akhavan argues that channeling the desire for 
vengeance into legal process has mitigated the severity of retaliatory 
abuses.383  Finally, the ICTR may prove to have a special positive effect:  the 
gradual internationalization of accountability in the African continent.384   
D. Lessons from Colonialism, Post-Colonialism:  Preliminary Justification 
for A Special Court for Liberia 
 A mechanism for criminal trials will be of special significance to 
Liberia for three reasons.  First, a trial will focus on elite-sponsored violence, 
beginning the process of ending the culture of impunity.385  As a cautionary 
note, the ability to amend the CPA in such a way as to be non-threatening to 
those who are likely to cause violence should allay frustrations over whether 
the push for a trial will foster instability in Liberia.  Second, promoting a 
special court for Liberia would help crimes specific to the Liberian context 
and rebuild Liberia’s national courts.  Finally, the international community 
has a duty to commit such resources to places like Liberia because similar 
investment has been committed to Sierra Leone, a country very similar to 
Liberia and to other countries.386   
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1. Ending the Culture of Impunity while Maintaining a Fragile Peace:  
Changing the Calculation of Liberian Politicians 
 Applying the analysis above to the Liberian context and recognizing 
that Liberian politicians have historically acted with a complete disregard of 
the needs of Liberian people, Liberia is a ripe setting to enforce an ethic of 
accountability.  Having Taylor at large will not prove helpful for Liberia’s 
transitional government, given his ability to dictate the movement of Liberian 
affairs even while in exile.387  As it stands, the current situation in Liberia 
sends a message that it is acceptable to rule through criminal behavior in 
Liberia.388  More specifically, in the African political context, holding those 
most responsible is necessary because of the nature of African politics since 
decolonization, a nature firmly rooted in the culture of impunity.389  
Remedying harmful aspects of the colonial legacy in African states will do a 
great deal to increase the legitimacy of African states in the eyes of the 
international community.   
 There is a growing number of critiques of the state-centered method 
(rule of law orthodoxy) by which the international community addresses the 
goal of encouraging respect for the rule of law.390  Even so, trials can 
contribute to achieving rule of law in a given society.  In the Liberian context, 
courts can play a crucial role in the country’s transformation to a real rule of 
law system because their very presence symbolizes a break from the past 
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assistance to state institutions yields greater impact and more sustainable outcomes 
than does support for civil society.    
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political arrangement.  Still, certain principles can be applied in any context.  
Litigation in the courts allows access to the new democracy.  And as 
Professor Ruti Teitel argues, courts can be the guardians of the new 
constitutional order.391  In this way, “the law expresses new norms and does 
the work of reconstruction.”392  Therefore, law does the work of exposing and 
delegitimizing the value system associated with past rule.  In a similar vein, 
Jamie O’Connell argues that transforming a political system into one that 
functions democratically requires a citizenry that holds government officials 
accountable.393  In countries such as Sierra Leone or Liberia, where ordinary 
people have become accustomed to abuses by the powerful, internationally-
supported courts and truth commissions may begin to undermine this culture 
of impunity.394  With the proper level of support, a hybrid tribunal reinforced 
by Liberian national courts might serve the positive role of constructing and 
enforcing established human rights principles.  It may also create and enforce 
new rules specific to the Liberian context because the judiciary will play a 
constructivist role that the transitional government cannot play as a result of 
its political weakness.   
 Sadly, however, few sources have dealt seriously with the notion of 
accountability for those who have caused a continual state of instability for 
Liberia.  In fact, plenty of critiques aim at the type of intervention sought 
here.  For example, Mohamed Ibn Chambas, executive secretary of 
ECOWAS, rejects the notion of a tribunal like Sierra Leone’s for Liberia.395  
He explains that “if it’s externally induced, the system may not be able to 
withstand the consequences.”396  In Africa, Chambas explains, “community 
bonds, loyalty to individuals are still strong.  If one rushes with certain high 
principles, it certainly won’t lead to stability.”397  Others suggest that 
Liberians would really prefer to leave these tragic events behind them and 
move on.398   
 Some organizations working in Liberia have indicated that “there is 
little expectation that any of those who have committed gross human rights 
violations, engaged in widespread corruption or looted government coffers in 
the past will ever be called to account.”399  To date, observers of the situation 
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in Liberia have mentioned in only a general way one of three possible avenues 
Liberia might pursue for justice:  
(1) referral of the issue to the SCSL;400  
(2) placing transitional justice for war crimes under authority of the 
International Criminal Court;401 or  
(3) creating a court for Liberia.402   
These individuals have not fully explored the real possibility of any of these 
avenues.   
 The predominant current moving against the implementation of 
judicial mechanisms to achieve justice in Liberia is that “the situation on the 
ground is by all counts still very precarious . . . .”403  The motif of a “fragile 
peace” has completely frozen the possibility of justice for Liberians by 
placing the future of the country at the whim of the rebels.   
 Yet this fear of moving forward with a special court for Liberia is 
largely unfounded given the example of Sierra Leone's experience.  
Policymakers have only dealt with the issue of creating a special court for 
Liberia in a cursory manner (to the exclusion of the extension of jurisdiction 
of the SCSL or referral of the matter to the International Criminal Court) 
because the international community does not know the ultimate effect of 
Sierra Leone’s court on peace in that country.404   
 In theory, the structure of a special court for Liberia would be similar 
to the one established in Sierra Leone.  Subject matter, temporal and personal 
jurisdiction of the court and selection of judges would follow the Sierra Leone 
model.  Funding could come either from assessed contributions or from part 
of the large reconstruction budget already allocated to Liberia.  In February of 
2004, a total of $520 million was pledged at Liberia’s donor’s conference.  
The United States pledged $200 million of this total.405  But, as of late 
October 2004, the transition government only received $354 million.406   
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 Some might argue that extending the jurisdiction of the SCSL is the 
simplest and fastest method of insuring justice for perpetrators of the most 
serious violations of crimes committed during the Liberian crisis.  After all, 
many of the actors that led the campaigns of violence operate in and out of the 
Mano River region, encompassing Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea.  This 
would require the UN to grant the SCSL Chapter VII authority, resulting in 
the Court having the authority to require Nigeria to turn over Charles Taylor.  
Furthermore, because the infrastructure is already in place, additional funding 
may be unnecessary.407  Because the charge of the court is to prosecute only 
those most responsible, there would only be a slight increase in the number of 
indictees.  Finally, the NTGL is not presently politically or financially ready 
to install its own courts.  These arguments would suggest that the extension of 
jurisdiction might be the only real way to achieve some sense of justice.     
 Yet the reality is that extension of the jurisdiction of the Sierra Leone 
Court to cover the Liberian civil war would not be the most productive option 
for Liberia.  Jacques Klein suggested that the expansion of the jurisdiction of 
the SCSL to cover Liberia would not be feasible for both legal and practical 
reasons.408  For example, the court is particularly adapted to Sierra Leone’s 
needs in that Sierra Leonean law will be applied in some circumstances.409  
Also, the subject matter of the contract only concerns crimes committed 
during the Sierra Leonean civil war, not those crimes committed during either 
of the Liberian crises.410  One additional lesson from the ad hoc tribunals has 
been to recognize the importance of local tribunals that truly serve the citizens 
of the country where the crimes were committed.411  Those who have 
evaluated the effectiveness of the Rwanda tribunal in Arusha, Tanzania, 
emphasize the myriad issues that arise with this structure.412  For example, a 
noted lack of connection between the Rwandan people and court proceedings 
exists because the ICTR has not adequately publicized their proceedings.413  
Furthermore, the trial’s location in Arusha has produced witness coordination 
difficulties.414  For these reasons, Liberia must face its past on its own turf.   
 More fundamental issues face the idea of referring the Liberia crisis 
to the International Criminal Court.  First, and most importantly, only crimes 
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committed after the entry into force of the Rome Statute (1 July 2002) can be 
brought before the ICC.415  The crimes committed in Liberia occurred well 
before 2002, even though some continued into 2003.416  With such a limited 
temporal jurisdiction, the ICC could not reach some of the perpetrators of the 
Liberian civil war.  Second, the states most likely to commit themselves to 
scrutiny are those least likely to violate human rights.417  Louise Arbour and 
Morten Bergsmo have argued that “the restrictive jurisdictional regime of the 
ICC Statute will make effective investigation and prosecution by the Court 
very difficult as long as a situation has not been referred by the Security 
Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.”418  Although Liberia has 
recently ratified the Rome Statute, there is no indication that it would submit 
its citizens to be tried.419  Finally, if Liberia were to submit to the ICC it risks 
losing the essential support of the United States, considering the United States 
lack of support of the ICC.420   
2.  Addressing Crimes Specific to the Liberian Context and Rebuilding 
Liberia’s National Courts 
 A hybrid tribunal would have the additional potential to influence the 
pace of law reform in the national courts of Liberia and assist in rebuilding 
Liberia’s own justice system.  Taking the second idea first, policy makers 
support the idea that courts applying both international and national law can 
help a country rebuild its own justice system and reform its laws.421  Because 
courts like the SCSL are in-country, diplomats hope the court's location will 
facilitate the diffusion of legal knowledge from international to local judicial 
officials.  This will assist in rebuilding the country’s own national judicial 
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system.422  If a hybrid court is successful, the host country’s legal system can 
learn from its effectiveness and efficiency.   
 Using the case of the SCSL, the International Center for Transitional 
Justice identified the three activities that it hopes will take place:   
(1) substantive law reform (drafting of new legislation to update old 
laws and bringing Sierra Leonean law into compliance with its 
international legal obligations),   
(2) professional development (development of relationships between 
international legal expertise and local legal professionals), and   
(3) raising awareness of the court as exemplary of an independent 
and well-functioning criminal court (introducing the concept of 
the court and creating awareness of legal processes to audiences 
outside of Freetown, the capital).423   
From these goals, policy makers in Sierra Leone hope to see updated and 
improved laws; availability of skills training and development opportunities 
for judges, lawyers, investigators, court administrators, and prison guards; 
and, finally, an increased public awareness and dialogue about criminal 
processes and the role they fulfill in post-conflict societies.424   
 A special tribunal might also help modernize potentially destructive 
cultural values.  Most importantly, using law to characterize certain acts as 
criminal can legitimize certain legal values and criminalize others.  
Criminalization, Kenneth Abbot argues, supports the penetration of 
international norms into national legal systems.425  Abbott argues that 
prosecutions of certain prominent figures might begin to change people’s 
perceptions of statehood and citizenship: “international legal institutions can 
be “teachers of norms,” shaping how governments and citizens perceive 
particular conduct.”426  Thus, citizens would be encouraged to reshape their 
view of governance and the duties of states and citizens. 
 This criminalization process has been evident in movements to 
eradicate societies of harmful traditional practices.  Still, the concern that 
arises when considering changing cultural values is whether societies can 
transform harmful practices without destroying the culture itself.  These 
questions were raised when Asian and African societies began to combat the 
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widely known practice of female genital mutilation.427  As soon as civil 
society groups in these countries began to speak out against these practices 
and western countries began to publicize the wrongs of female genital 
mutilation, countries began to pass legislation or to ban the practice.428  For 
example, Côte d’Ivoire promised the UN in 1991 to use its existing criminal 
code to prohibit the practice and passed a law prohibiting it in 1998.429  In 
Sierra Leone, civil society groups hope that the Special Court will have an 
impact on death penalty law in Sierra Leone.430  Though movements to 
change harmful traditional practices have been criticized by arguments that 
espouse theories of cultural relativism, 431 these theories are problematic and 
can be just as paternalistic as those calling for the elimination of harmful 
cultural practices.   
 One possible target area for a Special Court for Liberia is how 
Liberian warlords, including Charles Taylor, sanctioned the use of traditional 
belief in witchcraft and secret societies to further ritual killings.  Sierra 
Leonean and other supporters of the SCSL have credited the effort to address 
specific Sierra Leonean crimes for the way that the court will help criminalize 
acts that once appeared legitimate to the Sierra Leonean society.432   
 The violence that occurred in Liberia took on a religious nature where 
murders were of a particular brutal and inexplicable nature.433  Secret 
religious societies were a part of Liberian societies well before the coming of 
the Americo-Liberians in the 1800s.434  These ritualistic societies participated 
in ritual murder, provoking fear in both Americans and Liberians.  Yet, over 
time, and upon realizing that this form of traditional religion could not be 
                                                 
 427 UN Economic and Social Council, Integration of the Human Rights of 
Women and the Gender Perspective Violence Against Women, Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. Radhika 
Coomaraswamy, submitted in accordance with Commission on Human Rights 
resolution 2001/49 Cultural practices in the family that are violent towards women 7, 
U.N. Doc. No. (2002) [hereinafter UNESC, Violence Against Women]. 
 428 Id. at 11 
 429 Id.  
 430 ICTJ, Legacy, supra note 291, at 9. 
 431 UNESC, Violence Against Women, supra note 427, at 7, 11.  
 432 See, e.g., ICG, Promises and Pitfalls, supra note 411, at 14 (discussing the 
possibility of brining cases against those businessmen who bear the greatest 
responsibility in the Sierra Leone war).  The prosecutor for the Special Court has 
suggested that a possible line of argument against diamond dealers would be that 
there is an economy behind the conflict even if it is not a direct cause.  Id.;  Enclosure  
to Secretary-General Report S/2000/915, supra note 11, at 22, Statute of the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone, art. V.  
433 ELLIS, supra note 3, at 265 (describing practice of ritual cannibalism).  
 434 Id. at 221 
410 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF LEGAL INFORMATION [Vol. 33:3 
 
eradicated from society, Americo-Liberians and other politicians adopted 
these practices too.435  Presidents in Liberia consistently used religion as a 
way to justify certain public acts and to gain support of the leaders of the 
religious sects.436  For example, the Doe regime condoned the use of religion 
as a tool for murder.437  Charles Taylor did the same.438  A special court for 
Liberia would be a fertile site to address these aspects of Liberian society 
because the Liberian national justice system does not have the capacity to 
address these aspects of Liberian society on its own.   
3.  The Role of International Involvement and Equal Attention to Crises of 
Similar Impact 
 Finally, arguments for promoting justice in Liberia extend beyond the 
simple notion that justice can contribute to ending the culture of impunity and 
the promotion of law reform in African states.  Given the similarity between 
the conflicts in Sierra Leone and in Liberia, some type of court must be 
established simply because these conflicts deserve equal treatment by the 
international community.  Yet, despite the similarities between the conflicts in 
Sierra Leone and Liberia, the UN pushed for a court in Sierra Leone, but 
failed to do the same thing in Liberia, thereby sanctioning further lawlessness 
in Liberia.   
 Arguably, the UN’ inconsistent application of its Chapter VII powers 
in deploying Humanitarian Intervention missions throughout the world also 
evidences this policy.439  Scholars have noted that interventions are not evenly 
deployed between oppressed white populations on the European continent and 
oppressed brown populations on other continents.440  The possible effect of 
this failure to commit to African crises in general and to the Liberian crisis in 
particular may be the primary hindrance to establishing a lasting peace.441   
 These same scholars suggest that, if the UN would establish a 
consistent approach to humanitarian intervention—an approach grounded in 
precedent—a it could further solidify its legitimacy in the international 
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community.442  Currently, inconsistent application of international policy 
sends the message that deviance in Africa will be more acceptable than 
deviant behavior in other conflict areas.443  For Liberia in particular, failure to 
demand accountability will send a mixed message to the states in the entire 
Mano River region; in this area of Africa where the conflicts have similar root 
causes and perpetrators operate across borders, violence will be sanctioned in 
some countries but not others.  
 Establishing Special Courts will not be the answer in every 
transitional context.  In Liberia, however, the circumstances are ripe for 
introducing this type of judicial mechanism.  The Peace Agreement process in 
Liberia consistently fails and consistently evades the basic problems of elite 
power in Liberia.444  Even today, with the new peace agreement, the 
transitional government fails to prevent the spread of corruption and fiscal 
mismanagement.445  In fact, the transitional government, comprised of rebels-
turned-politicians and wealth-opportunity-seeking politicians, takes advantage 
of the absence of opposition and the ambiguity of the CPA to endow itself 
with powers beyond those granted in the Agreement.446  This pattern is not 
new in Liberia. 
 Committing crimes with impunity can be stopped through the process 
of an internationally supervised justice system.  The Special Court system 
would be a first step in acknowledging that Liberian leaders cannot continue 
to rule over Liberia without considering the needs of the Liberian people.  It is 
high time that the international community recognizes and defends the notion 
that there are limits to the exercise of state sovereignty.  Specifically, when a 
state can no longer function as a state because its overseers are the same 
actors who continuously act against the state’s very existence, the 
international community must demand that those state actors be held 
accountable for their acts.  None of the non-punitive mechanisms of 
transitional justice address the issue of state-sponsored violence, nor does a 
peace agreement that calls for power sharing with the same actors who benefit 
from state decay and forgiveness of the crimes they commit. 
E.  Ensuring Legitimacy through a Strong U.S. Commitment to Liberia 
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 Liberia’s TRC is less than ideal because it hands over the Liberian 
state to rebel leaders through a blanket amnesty and refuses to confront 
Liberia’s culture of impunity.  In the spirit of optimism, however, Liberia still 
has a chance to redirect its efforts.  Liberia has failed, but it can recover with 
sufficient political will and targeted and well-funded external aid.447  Rotberg 
suggests that a major power can play a key role in revitalizing a failed state in 
any of the following ways:   
• providing security,  
• developing a rudimentary police force,  
• training local officials across bureaucratic departments, and  
• regularizing the local economies.448   
It will not be enough, however, for a major power to be present merely to 
gloss over the problems of these countries.   
 
 Ensuring long-term peace, security and stability will require keeping 
in mind the long-term needs of these countries.  Most importantly, a guarantor 
can help maintain security throughout the country.  The United States has a 
special duty to encourage Liberia, like Sierra Leone, to take the extra step to 
prosecute the individuals most responsible for atrocities in Liberia.  This 
would be a positive first step on the road to ending the culture of impunity in 
Liberia.  The United States has reason grounded in history and diplomacy to 
commit itself to lending a hand to Liberia.   
 The United States’ crucial decision whether to commit the necessary 
resources to ensuring a stable future for Liberia will determine whether a 
Special Court could ever be realistically implemented and whether Liberians 
would perceive it as a legitimate mechanism.  If the United States becomes 
involved in Liberia in a dedicated way, just as the British have involved 
themselves in Sierra Leone, the possibility for justice could be real.  The 
United States' powerful presence would ensure financial backing for the 
Special Court, and with enough troops on the ground, the security issue posed 
by the rebels would be resolved.   
 Liberians have also expressed the need for U.S. commitment, more so 
than most African nations.449  O’Connell echoes this view by arguing that an 
international peacekeeping and reconstruction mission in Liberia, similar to 
those in Sierra Leone and Cote d’Ivoire under the leadership of the United 
Kingdom and France, would seal the comprehensive effort to end war in West 
Africa.450  In fact, O’Connell argues that the United States is the only country 
that can end the war for good in Liberia because of the unique respect that the 
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United States commands in Liberia.451  One way to ensure peaceful 
implementation of a court is through the assurance of adequate additional 
peacekeeping forces.  However, the number of American peacekeepers in 
Liberia is currently inadequate to maintain the fragile peace.452   
 The United States has continued to play an ambivalent and undecided 
role in Liberia.  For example, in the summer of 2003 when the international 
community was begging Charles Taylor to leave Liberia so that some type of 
peace could be achieved, U.S. and African newspapers had different accounts 
of how the United States should intervene in the Liberia crisis.453  Liberians 
saw clear reasons for a strong U.S. intervention, while official American 
policy on Liberia remained unclear throughout Liberia’s war.  After a small 
deployment of troops to Liberia, nothing more was heard of the United States’ 
plans for its future relationship with Africa’s oldest republic, despite how at 
other times in US-Liberia relations, the U.S. has vowed to remain a close ally 
to Liberia.454   
 American newspapers caught on and understood that unequal policies 
were being applied between Sierra Leone and Liberia.455  The fate of Liberia 
has been a direct product of Liberia's peculiar history.  As explained above, 
the British took the lead in corralling international intervention for Sierra 
Leone, its former colony.456  The French did the same for Cote d’Ivoire.457  
For nearly 150 years, Liberia remained a virtual American colony, and during 
the Cold War it ranked among Washington’s most useful allies.458  But the 
United States has never recognized itself as an imperial power, let alone a 
colonial one despite clear historical evidence attesting to the fact.459 
 Whether it will admit it or not, the United States has a historic 
connection to the Liberian nation.  The United States is constantly reminded 
of this relationship by the Liberian people and by members of the United 
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States Congress, especially African-American members.460  Liberian heads of 
state clearly and continually have availed themselves of the unique historic 
fact that Liberia was an experiment in U.S. repatriation policy.461  
Furthermore, Liberian people remained hopeful towards the end of the civil 
war that the United States would intervene on their behalf.462  This hope 
persisted as civil society groups in Liberia depended on the United States to 
play the lead role in intervention during Liberia’s transition period.463  Rebels 
in Liberia have even commented that they were more willing lay down their 
arms if the United States asked them.464  Part of the Liberian people’s 
willingness to respect the force of the United States stems from the idea that 
the United States helped create the modern Liberian state. 465  These feelings 
and the rationale for U.S. involvement have also been echoed by some in the 
United States.466   
 Despite the fact that some see the obvious role that the United States 
could and should play in Liberia, the official voice of U.S. policy in Liberia is 
ambivalent.  On the one hand, members of the U.S. Department of State have 
stated clearly that the United States must play the lead in humanitarian 
assistance in Liberia.467  During a recent hearing on U.S. policy toward 
Liberia, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Walter Kansteiner 
stressed that America is willing to put American “boots on the ground” in 
Liberia, that it would project force when necessary, and that it would 
participate in diplomatic negotiation with rebel groups and tough 
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governments.468  Kansteiner also acknowledged that security is key to 
Liberia’s transition and that ECOWAS was providing the forces to secure 
Liberia.469   
 On the other hand, President Bush’s policy in Liberia at the end of the 
war was to merely lend support to ECOWAS under certain conditions:  “the 
departure of Charles Taylor from office and from Liberia, a cease-fire 
between rebel groups and Liberian government forces, and the firm 
commitment by West African countries to provide leadership and the bulk of 
the troops for any peacekeeping effort.”470  The result of Bush’s policy was 
ECOWAS’ deployment of the ECOWAS military mission in Liberia 
(ECOMIL) instead of U.S. troops on the ground.471  In June 2003, the 
Department of State sent 1,800 personnel to Liberia where they waited 
offshore to assist if needed in securing the U.S. Embassy and evacuating 
Americans and foreign nationals due to the threat posed by rebels.472  The 
largest contingency of American “boots on the ground” in Liberia was never 
more than the offshore, 2,100-person U.S.S. Iwo Jima Amphibious Readiness 
Group.473   
 African-American members of Congress have continually highlighted 
the policy of the United States in refusing to deploy ground troops in Liberia 
despite the United States’ economic, military, and political interests in Liberia 
since the beginning of 1822.474  They have often suggested that the United 
States has two policies: an Iraq policy and a Liberia (Africa) policy.475   
 I highlight the tensions in U.S. policy toward Liberia for several 
reasons, but primarily as a call to the United States to live up to its history in 
Liberia.  After all, Liberia is a part of America’s slave history.  But, there are 
other important reasons.  First, U.S. policy needs to be clarified.  It is clear 
that U.S. policy is inconsistent and that members of Congress and other 
branches of the U.S. government have wildly divergent views on how the 
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United States should relate to Liberia.476  Second, the disparity in U.S. policy 
in different countries should be recognized:  for example, the United States 
gives freely to development programs in Iraq but is stingy when it comes to 
aid for Liberia.477  Whereas the international community seems to be firmly 
dedicated to peace in Sierra Leone—maintaining at least 13,000 U.N. 
peacekeeping troops to ensure the security of the Sierra Leonean people as the 
government there tries to implement their various transitional justice 
mechanisms—there is no equal commitment to Liberia.478  In Sierra Leone, 
just as in colonial times, and after Sierra Leone’s independence, the British 
have remained to aid the government in an advisory capacity.479  Yet, Liberia 
finds itself in a precarious position with no superpower on which to lean.   
 Contrary to popular opinion, the involvement of the United States in 
Liberia would not create huge costs for the United States.  Jamie O’Connell, 
law clerk to the Honorable James R. Browning, argues that U.S. leadership in 
the reconstruction of Liberia might actually lead to some political gains.480  
O’Connell argues that U.S. leadership in Liberia would counter the view that 
the “U[.]S[.] shirks its international responsibilities.”481  O’Connell ultimately 
argues that a U.S. intervention in Liberia would require only modest military, 
economic, and political resources.482  This would cost about $200 million per 
year for the first five years of reconstruction, and perhaps $100 million per 
year thereafter for 10 years-$1.5 billion over ten years.483  To get a sense of 
how small these figures are, O’Connell observes that the United States is 
spending $18.6 billion on reconstruction in Iraq, roughly $480 billion on 
defense and homeland security in 2004 and $5.4 trillion dollars from 2004 to 
2013.484    
 In sum, sustainable nationbuilding demands more than a quick fix.  It 
requires a long-term commitment from the developed world to building 
capacities, strengthening security, and developing human resources.  The 
uncomfortable but necessary lesson from Liberia’s partially effective attempts 
at rebuilding the Liberian state is that the revival of failed states will prove 
more successful if a regional or international organization or superpower 
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takes charge of oversight and financial support of the process, and only 
gradually relinquishes authority to a transitional administration.485   
CONCLUSION 
 Liberia’s civil war is officially over, yet the war criminals are free and 
some are even helping run the transitional government under CPA authority.  
Meanwhile, Charles Taylor relaxes in Nigeria’s resort city of Calabar.  By 
contrast, Sierra Leone’s brave step to implement the SCSL is commendable 
because it signals a desire to begin the transition to rule of law and the end of 
rule by impunity.  Sierra Leone can be a model for Liberia.   
 Legal mechanisms do have their limits and cannot function alone.  It 
goes without saying that tribunals are not and should not be a substitute for 
early global intervention.  An effective post-war regime must include 
institutions for monitoring abuses, conflict avoidance measures, sustainable 
peace, protection of minority rights, election supervision, and other 
functions.486  Legal mechanisms will not work without strong political 
mechanisms and economic support to combat Africa’s post-colonial weak 
state syndrome.487  Still, by revisiting the colonial period and the growth of 
the post-colonial African political ruling style, we can see the growth of a 
culture of impunity.  Rule by African elites without answering to their own 
people has directly caused a failure of their states.   
 Liberia has become the quintessential example of an African failed 
state.  The goal of this article has been to show that Liberia can begin to end 
the culture of impunity and ring in a sustainable peace.  This will happen if 
the intervention of the transitional government of Liberia and the international 
community focuses on changing the behavior of political elites instead of 
focusing exclusively on reconciliation among the masses.  Unfortunately, 
Liberia's present CPA does precisely that; it focuses exclusively on 
reconciliation.  Ultimately, positive change is far more likely in Liberia 
through the use of judicially punitive mechanisms such as prosecution in a 
hybrid Special Court of law. 
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